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Abstract
1
. 
Although the CML (Capital Market Line), the Intertemporal-CAPM, the CAPM/SML (Security Market Line) 
and the Intertemporal Arbitrage Pricing Theory (IAPT) are widely used in portfolio management, valuation and 
capital markets financing; these theories are inaccurate and can adversely affect risk management and portfolio 
management processes.  This article introduces several empirically testable financial theories that provide 
insights, and can be calibrated to real data and used to solve problems, and contributes to the literature by: i) 
explaining the conditions under which ICAPM/CAPM, IAPT and CML may be accurate, and why such 
conditions are not feasible; and explaining why the existence of incomplete markets and dynamic un-aggregated 
markets render CML, IAPT and ICAPM inaccurate; ii) explaining why the Consumption-Savings-Investment-
Production framework is insufficient for asset pricing and analysis of changes in risk and asset values; and 
introducing a “unified” approach to asset pricing that simultaneously considers six factors, and the conditions 
under which this approach will work; iii) explaining why leisure, taxes and housing are equally as important as 
consumption and investment in asset pricing; iv) introducing the Marginal Rate of Intertemporal Joint 
Substitution  (MRIJS) among Consumption, Taxes, Investment, Leisure, Intangibles and Housing - this model 
incorporates Regret Theory and captures features of reality that don’t fit well into standard asset pricing models, 
and this framework can support specific or very general finance theories and or very complicated models; v) 
showing why the Elasticity of  Intertemporal Substitution (EIS) is inaccurate and is insufficient for asset pricing 
and analysis of investor preferences.              
 
Keywords: Risk; Dynamic Asset Pricing; portfolio management; Game Theory; Regret Theory; ICAPM; IAPT; 
Complexity.  
 
 
1. Introduction. 
Researchers have since noted the many problems inherent in the one-period capital asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and the one-period Arbitrage Pricing Theory, and have developed the Intertemporal-CAPM, the Intertemporal 
APT, and the multifactor CAPM.  The CML remains a somewhat un-challenged theory that has significant 
flaws.  However, the IAPT, ICAPM and the CML are very inaccurate.   
 
2. Existing Literature. 
The existing on the CML, IAPT and ICAPM is extensive, and has been centered on the Consumption-
Investment-Production debate.  Balvers & Huang (2005) describes the three main classes of research in asset 
pricing which are as follows.  The first line of research is the Consumption-based approach of Breeden (1979) - 
which is uses a pricing kernel related to the marginal utility of consumption.  Initial versions of the 
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consumption-based approach have not worked well empirically, and studies using this approach include 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2002), and Parker and Julliard (2005).  The main 
problem with this approach is that consumption and its marginal utility are difficult to measure. Balvers & 
Huang (2005) state that there are asset pricing models that include a production sector but focus predominately 
on explaining the size of the equity premium. Jermann (1998) argues that both adjustment cost and habit 
persistence are needed to match the observed equity premium. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) focused on 
limited inter-sectoral factor mobility and habit persistence in order to explain several aspects of the equity 
premium and key facts of the overall economy. Jermann (2003) provides an interesting channel through which 
gains in productivity push up the equity  premium given a concave production function, heterogeneous size of 
the firm in terms of its labor inputs, and a small elasticity of labor.  The path breaking model by Gomes, Kogan, 
and Zhang (2003) provides a structural theory of the risk sensitivities of firms differing by value and size 
attributes.  Balvers & Huang (2005) state that these approaches focusing on the equity premium belong to the 
consumption-based approach, rather than the production-based approach, because they use the marginal rate of 
inter-temporal substitution (with or without a habit factor) as the pricing kernel.  
The second line of research is the Merton (1973) Marginal Utility approach.  However, the marginal 
utility of wealth is also affected by state variables that indicate how valuable wealth is in different states, but 
also raises the issue of the importance of state variables - any variables that affect future risk or risk aversion is 
relevant, and examples include the variables governing habit persistence, irrationality, Regret, utility of 
investment/savings and the aggregate supply variables affecting productivity. Petkova & Zhang (2005).  
The third line of research is based on production analysis.  Liew & Vassalou (2000). Vassalou (2003).  
Peng and Shawky (1999), Cochrane’s (1991). Jermann (2005).  Balvers, Cosimano, and McDonald (1990) and 
Cechetti, Lam, and Mark (1990) argue that aggregate output is equal or proportionate to aggregate consumption 
and that the marginal utility of consumption can be evaluated at the observed level of output, and thus, aggregate 
output growth is the main asset pricing factor.  The assumed advantage of this approach is that output growth is 
likely to be measured more accurately than consumption growth.  Cochrane (1991,1996) developed a different 
production-based perspective,  which explicitly derives an expression for investment returns and assumes that 
these can be used to price asset returns.  Li, Vassalou and Xing (2003) use a more disaggregated model and 
found that a four-factor investment-growth approach increases the model fit dramatically.  Kim (2003) provides 
a different theoretical perspective by using duality theory in Cochrane’s (1996) framework.  Vassalou and 
Apedjinou (2003) empirically developed a corporate innovation factor and showed that this factor, when added 
to the market factor, absorbs the momentum effect in cross-sectional asset prices.  The Balvers & Huang (2005) 
model is fundamentally different from the other production-based asset pricing approaches because it derives a 
pricing kernel based on the state-contingent optimal reactions by firms to productivity shocks; and this kernel is 
shown to depend largely on factors determining the marginal value of capital.  This approach assumes: a) that in 
a competitive economy with complete financial markets, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is tied to 
a stochastic version of the marginal rate of intertemporal transformation, b) a perfect competition, c) complete 
markets, d) neoclassical environment where supply shocks in the form of productivity shocks are important.  
Cho (2009) analyzed how Korean households make savings and portfolio decisions (housing plays a 
special role in the portfolios of households: collateral, a source of service flows, as well as a source of potential 
capital gains or losses) and also analyzed the role of institutional features by comparing several alternative 
housing market arrangements to assess their impact on wealth accumulation, portfolio choices, and 
homeownership. Cho (2009) found that a Lower down-payment also increases both the home ownership ratio 
and the fraction of aggregate wealth held in housing assets but lowers aggregate net worth with mixed 
demographic implications.     
Chambers, Garriga & Schlagenhauf (2009a) analyzed how loan structure affects the borrower's selection 
of a mortgage contract and  the aggregate economy; and found that  the loan structure is a quantitatively 
significant factor in a household's housing finance decision; and is dependent on age and income and that these 
effects are more important when inflation is low. Inflation reduces the real value of the mortgage payment and 
the changes in the structure of mortgages have implications for risk sharing. Chambers, Garriga & Schlagenhauf 
(2009b) found that although most countries have tax provisions and subsidies to promote homeownership 
(which generate an asymmetry in the tax treatment of owner- and rental-occupied housing, which affects the 
incentives to supply tenant-occupied housing), the progressivity of income taxation can amplify or mitigate the 
effects of the asymmetries with important implications for housing tenure, housing consumption, portfolio re-
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allocations, and welfare that differ from those reported in the literature.   
The asset pricing model developed in Albuquerque & Wang (2008) focuses on corporate governance 
issues within a consumption-production-investment framework but: i) does not does account for the costs of 
enforcement of investor protection, ii) erroneously assumes that increases in investor protection automatically 
results in firm growth – differences in investor cognition, investor objectives, ability to process information, and 
the perceived value of investor protection may dampen positive investor perceptions about firm values, iii) over-
estimates and over-emphasizes the corporate powers and operational powers of majority shareholders which are 
quite limited in many common law jurisdictions, and which are also limited even when majority shareholders 
are managers/officers of the firm (statutorily limited by the “business judgment rule”; fiduciary-duty statutes 
that apply to officers/directors of corporate entities; and threat of Shareholder derivative lawsuits; and Sarbanes 
Oxley Act and similar statutes; and investor protection laws enacted by securities exchanges and by securities 
regulations; and also limited by common-law rules such as the duty of loyalty, fiduciary duties, fraud, 
usurpation of corporate opportunities; etc.), iv) omits the fact that even where there are majority shareholders, 
third party investors value “independent” boards (which theoretically and actually reduces the influence of 
majority shareholders), v) makes un-realistic assumptions about the portfolio holdings of minority investors and 
majority investors, vi) makes un-realistic assumptions about the path of growth of the firm’s dividends and firm 
value.  The utility functions introduced in Albuquerque & Wang (2008) are limited and un-realistic and dont 
define the scope and ramifications inherent in the agent’s decision context.  
Miao & Wang (2007) attempted to analyze the joint decisions of business investments, 
consumption/savings and portfolio selection for an entrepreneur within a real options framework.  The asset 
pricing analysis in Miao & Wang (2007), is flawed because: i) as explained in this article, ICAPM/CAPM are 
incorrect, and thus, the “market portfolio” does not exist in reality; and ii) entrepreneurs’ inter-temporal wealth 
allocation/re-allocation decisions are often intertwined with the perceived risks of their ventures and often focus 
more on the short term (which affects the entrepreneur’s utility function and greater-than-normal Regret, both of 
which were not appropriately defined in Miao & Wang (2007)) – these issues were not separated in Miao & 
Wang (2007), iii) the entrepreneur’s utility function and preferences are time-inconsistent because of short-term 
focus.  The utility functions introduced in Miao & Wang (2007) are limited and un-realistic and dont define the 
scope and ramifications inherent in the agent’s decision context.  However, Miao & Wang (2007) correctly 
noted that Real Options theory and approaches erroneously assume that: (i) the real investment opportunity is 
tradable; (ii) its payoff can be spanned by existing traded assets; or (iii) the agent is risk neutral.   
Wang (2009) attempted to analyze an agent’s optimal consumption-saving and portfolio choice 
decisions when he/she cannot fully insure his income shocks and does not know his income growth rate.  The 
relevance of the theories and conclusions in Wang (2009) to real world transactions/events is very limited.  Most 
individuals know or can reasonably estimate any expected growth in their labor income.  Most individuals 
cannot hedge their labor income and dont seek to hedge their labor income.  Furthermore, there are very few and 
very limited insurance markets for hedging of labor income (such markets dont exist in most countries).  The 
utility functions introduced in Wang (2009) are limited and un-realistic and dont define the scope and 
ramifications inherent in the agent’s decision context.   
Nelson & Wu (1998) found that the standard intertemporal asset pricing model cannot predict risk 
premia with the correct sign. 
Nwogugu (2006), Nwogugu (2005); Prono (Jan. 2009); Prono (June 2007); Green & Hollifield (1992); 
Guo (May/June 2004); Kumar & Ziemba (1993); Lewellen & Nagel (2006), Roll (1977); Flam (2010); 
Gharghori, Chan & Faff (2007); Green & Hollifield (1992); Taleb (2008); Neely, Roy & Whiteman (1999), and 
Mar, Bird, Casavecchia & Yeung (2009), have shown that the ICAPM/CAPM are inaccurate and thus, the 
“Market portfolio” is not the most efficient portfolio in terms of risk-reward trade-offs.  Some of the issues 
raised in these articles are also applicable to IAPT, and imply that the IAPT is also inaccurate.    
Avramov & Chordia (2006); Fama & French (1996); Gay & Jung (1999); Joyce & Vogel (1970); 
Moskowitz (2003); Seckin (2001); Brav & Heaton (2002); Brown & Cliff (2004); Hirshleifer (2001); Chen & 
Cheng-Ho & Jordan (1997); Hong & Stein (2003); Llewellen, Nagel & Shanken (2007); Lettau & Ludvigson 
(2001); Jaganathan & Wang (2002); Hodrick & Zhang (2001); Ferson, Sarkissian & Simin (2003); Goval & 
Welch (2008); Campbell & Cochrane (2000); Shanken (1990); Fama (1998); Ehrhardt (Summer 1987); Bray 
(1994); Campbell, Kazemi & Nanisetty (1999); Braun & Larrain (2005), Iacoviello & Pavan (Nov. 2009), 
Jamison & Wegener (Nov. 2009), Banerjee (2007), and Donihue & Avramenko (March 2007) documented 
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various anomalies and errors in asset pricing models (mostly consumption-based and production-based asset 
pricing models).  Cochrane (1996) developed an investment based asset pricing model, which performed as well 
as the CAPM and the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) factor model, and performed substantially better than a 
simple consumption-based model.  Attanasio & Paiella (2007) and Gerard & Wu (2006) concluded that 
Intertemporal Risk is very relevant in Asset Allocation.  Detemple & Murthy (1997); Campbell, Kazemi & 
Nanisetty (1999); Gomes, Yaron & Zhang (2006); Basak & Croitoru (2000); Basak & Croitoru (2000) and Ou-
Yang (2005) analyzed the conditions for equilibrium.  Battig & Jarrow (1999) introduced a useful definition of 
market completeness that is relevant to asset pricing.  Gomes, Yaron & Zhang (2006) concluded that financing 
frictions provide an important common factor for the cross section of stock returns and that financial frictions 
are more important when economic conditions are relatively good.  
 
The CML provides a formulation for the ‘optimal portfolio’.  The major elements of the CML are: 
1) The CML contains some risk free assets. 
2) The CML is partly based on the risk free rate. 
3) The CML assumes that risky assets earn a return equal to the risk-premium – in this article, the risk-premium 
will refer to the difference between the return on the market and the risk-free rate (rm-rf).  
 
The ICAPM and IAPT supposedly address the intertemporal nature of decisions and risk management, 
and provide the ‘expected return’ for any asset.  The ICAPM and the IAPT are supposedly improvements on the 
CAPM and APT models. The major elements of the ICAPM/IAPT are:     
1. The Expected Return is based on the risk free rate.  The investor’s cost of capital is irrelevant.  
2. There are significant “Anchoring Effects”.   
3. Returns are directly proportional to risk.  
4. The Expected Return is largely determined by the returns on the market over multiple periods; or in the case 
of the APT, by the specified factors over multiple periods.   
5. All investors can earn the Risk-Premium – the “risk-premium” will refer to the difference between the return 
on the market and the risk-free rate (rm-rf).       
6. The Beta(s) (ICAPM) and the regression coefficients (IAPT) truly reflects the relationship between the 
market return (ICAPM) or the factors (IAPT) and the subject asset .   
7. There is no utility from hedging.   
   
The SML and the APT provide formulas for the ‘expected return’ for any asset.  The major elements of the 
SML/APT are:     
1. The Expected Return is based on the risk free rate.  There are significant “Anchoring Effects”.   
2. Returns are directly proportional to risk.  
2. The Expected Return is largely determined by the returns on the market; or in the case of the APT, by the 
specified factors. .   
3. All investors can earn the Risk-Premium – in this article, the risk-premium will refer to the difference 
between the return on the market and the risk-free rate (rm-rf).       
4. The Beta(s) truly reflects the relationship between the market return and the subject asset.   
5. There is no utility from hedging. 
 
 
3. The Inaccurate Assumptions.      
The ICAPM/IAPT and CML are based on many erroneous assumptions, some of which are analyzed as 
follows – since all of these assumptions are invalid, the CML/ICAPM/IAPT are invalid.      
 
Error Condition-#1: There Is Continuous Trading And Portfolio Re-Balancing.  
ICAPM, IAPT and the CML can be valid only if there is continuous portfolio re-balancing  – ie. portfolio re-
balancing is done every one-hundredth of a second or in even shorter intervals.  With today’s technology, 
continuous portfolio re-balancing is not possible.  Firstly, it takes time to make decisions and process 
transactions (even electronically processed transactions). Today’s trading technology and the duration of back-
office processes do not permit such frequent trading.  Even if it were valid, the CML, the ICAPM and the IAPT 
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are only a snap shot of the optimal portfolio at a specific point in time.  The effective yield on a risk free asset 
changes over time, and is equal to the stated yield only if the asset is held until “maturity”.  Similarly, the 
effective yield on a risky asset changes over time.  Hence, for CML, ICAPM and IAPT to be valid, the 
proportions of the risky and risk-free asset have to be constantly changed, as their yields change over time.     
 
Error Condition-#2: There Are No Transaction Costs Or Taxes.      
The ICAPM/IAPT and the CML models erroneously assume that there are no transaction costs.  In a 
world with transaction costs, the expected return, yield on the risk-free asset and the Beta will be affected by 
transaction costs.    The transaction costs will reduce the yields from the risk-free asset, distort the ‘risk-
premium”, and also distort the percentage of total assets invested in the risk free asset and the risky asset.  
Transaction costs affect the effective sensitivity to the market or to ‘factors’.          
The ICAPM/IAPT and the CML formulas/models erroneously assume that there are no income or 
capital-gains taxes.  In a world with either capital gains or income taxes, the effective ‘risk-free’ rate will be 
distorted, and the Risk-Premium will be distorted.  In a world with either capital gains or income taxes, the 
effective yields from the ‘risk-free’ and risky assets will be different from the stated yields; and taxes will distort 
the proportion of assets invested in both the risky and risk-free assets.   
 
Error Condition-#3: There Are No Synthetic Securities.   
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas erroneously assume that there are no synthetic securities.  Synthetic 
securities can be used to replicate a position in the risk-free rate but with higher returns, and the following 
portfolios are examples – a) a high-yield bond (with a yield of 10-12%) plus a T-Bond futures contract; b) a high 
yield bond plus a put option or a forward contract; or c) a long term commercial lease plus lease insurance.  
Similarly, synthetic securities can be used to replicate a long position in the ‘market’ but with higher returns – ie 
a combination of index futures and a high-yield stock.  With availability of synthetic securities, the 
purposes/role of the risk free rate and the risk-premium are eliminated.     
 
Error Condition-#4: There Cannot Be Any Hedging.   
ICAPM/IAPT and the CML can be valid only if there cannot be any hedging.  Intertemporal Hedging transforms 
expected returns by placing a lower bound on returns.  With hedging, the risk premium can or will always be 
positive, and the relationship between the Beta (or in IAPT, any factor) and the expected return is 
truncated/bounded.  Hedging can be costly or costless and this distinction renders IAPT/ICAPM and CML 
inaccurate.  The combination of Hedging and synthetic securities renders the assumptions of ICAPM/IAPT and 
CML meaningless.        
 
Error Condition-#5: There Are No Framing Effects.  
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas can be valid if and only if there are no framing effects.   
In the case of ICAPM, framing pertains to a) the use of the risk-free rate and the market return to 
calculate the risk premium, b) to the use of the risk free rate, and to the use of the beta.  Framing Effects have 
been defined in the literature.     
 
Error Condition-#6: Losses Don’t Have Any Utility And Don’t Cause Regret.    
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas can be valid if and only if losses don’t have any utilities and don’t 
cause Regret.  On the contrary, some investors objectives include obtaining losses.  With the advent of 
derivative instruments, losses can be deferred, transferred, and sold.  The enforcement of tax laws, causes 
investors to now focus on after-tax returns and consequences in financial decision making.  Hence, in a world in 
which losses have utility and can cause positive Regret, the concept of “Risk Premium” is moot, because some 
investors may seek negative Risk Premia, and Beta is meaningless.  
 
Error Condition-#7: Everybody Can Borrow/Lend At The Risk-Free Rate.    
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas can be valid if and only if everybody can borrow and or lend at the 
Risk Free rate.  Unfortunately, only a very small percentage of capital markets participants can borrow/lend at 
the Risk-Free Rate.  The Risk Premium is erroneously defined with reference to only the Risk Free Rate, 
without reference to the investment opportunity set available to each capital market participant, or to the 
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participant’s actual cost of capital.  There is a finite volume of risk-free assets that can be purchased or sold at 
any point in time, and so the Risk-Free rate is not available to all capital market investors - this volume of assets 
changes instantaneously and cannot be controlled by any one capital markets participant.     
 
Error Condition-#8: All Investors Can Earn The “Risk-Premium”.     
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas can be valid if and only if all participants in the capital markets can 
earn the “Risk Premium”.  Firstly the Risk Premium (the difference between the market and risk-free returns) 
changes instantaneously and cannot be controlled by any one capita markets participant.  The Risk Premium 
changes for each time interval (daily, monthly, quarterly and yearly) and the rate of change over different time 
intervals is not proportional and is distorted.  Not all capital markets participants can earn the Risk premium, 
because there is only a finite volume of securities/products that can be sold/purchased in order to achieve the 
Risk Premium.  Furthermore, since most indices don’t reflect the true nature of the underlying markets, the 
market return can be achieved only by owning accurate proportions of all securities traded in a market.    
 
Error Condition-#9: All “Risk-Free” Assets (Typically Treasury Securities) Are Truly Risk-Free; And The Risk 
Free Rate is Constant.   
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas can be valid if and only if all Risk Free assets are truly risk 
free.  “Risk-Free” assets earn the risk-free rate and function as ‘risk-free’ assets’ if and only if they are held until 
maturity, which usually is not the case in real life. Furthermore, the events that occurred in Italy, Spain and 
Greece during 2008-2013 show that there are no risk-free assets and that government bonds are risky and 
default.     
 
Error Condition-#10: Firms Dot Have Any Financing Constraints; And Can Borrow At Any Interest Rate.  
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas can be valid if and only if all firms can borrow any amount of money 
at any interest rate that they desire – which is inaccurate.  Most asset pricing models erroneously assume that 
firms don’t have financing constraints and can borrow at any time, and at any interest rate above the risk free 
rate.  Constraints include – capital markets conditions, legal constraints (loan covenants, statutes, bankruptcy 
court rules, etc.), credit quality, availability of capital, usury statutes, etc..  
 
Error Condition-#11: The Risk Free Rate And Beta Remain Constant During All Time Periods.   
ICAPM/IAPT and CML models/formulas erroneously can be correct if and only if the Risk Free and 
Beta (or IAPT factors) remain constant over all time periods – which is not possible.  Furthermore, many 
researchers have documented significant problems in calculating Beta  - there are various ways of calculating 
Beta and there is no industry standard method for calculating Beta.  Hence, time-varying Betas are also 
inaccurate because there is no guarantee that the calculated beat will vary instantaneously with changes in the 
market  - the models include critical but often false assumptions about the distribution of returns of the 
“market”.     
 
Error Condition-12: All Portfolios Are Superior To All Individual Assets.    
The CML, IAPT and ICAPM models/formula erroneously assume that all portfolios of assets are superior to 
holding only one single asset.  This property follows from the assume diversification property inherent in the M-
V framework.  On the contrary, there are assets that may have much better risk-reward profiles than some 
portfolios.   
 
Error Condition-#13: All Assets Have The Same “Duration”.   
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas erroneously assume that all assets have the dame duration.  The 
Duration referred to, is the same used in fixed-income analysis.  If all Common Stock of all companies don’t 
have the same duration, then assumptions underlying the Beta (and factors in IAPT) and Risk Premium are 
wrong.  Risk Free assets (government bonds and AAA-rated securities) of the same maturity don’t have the 
same duration – the causes of differences in duration include interest payments, call provisions, put rights, form 
of repayment (cash vs. common stock vs. Pay-in-Kind), etc.  Secondly all common stock don’t have the same 
duration - the causes of differences in duration include dividends, corporate by-laws, anti take-over laws, 
warrants/options issued, trading rules, and perceived risk of the company.   
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Error Condition-#14: Interest Rates And The Yield Curve Remain Constant During All Investment Horizons.  
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas erroneously assume that interest rates and the yield curve remain 
constant over any time interval.  If interest rates change, then there will immediately be arbitrage opportunities 
between short term and long term securities or across assets.   
 
Error Condition-#15: All Investors In The Capital Markets Have Constant Amounts of Knowledge.   
CML erroneously  assumes that all investors/participants in any given capital market have constant amounts of 
knowledge and the same amount of knowledge.  This is not true because: a) different market participants have 
different amounts of knowledge and perception  of each company/security/asset, b) different market participants 
have different information processing skills and     
 
Error Condition-#16: There Are No Limits On The Volume Of Short Positions That An Investor Can Take.  
CML erroneously  assumes that there are no .limits on the volume of short positions that an investor can enter 
into.  In reality, investors’ possible short positions are limited by: a) availability of securities to short, b) the 
financing cost of short positions, c) the limitations on available synthetic short positions.            
 
Error Condition-#17: The Financing Cost Of Short Positions Is Lower Than The Risk Free Rate And The Risk-
Premium.   
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas implicitly erroneously assume that the financing cost of short 
positions is always lower than the risk free rate and the risk premium.  If the converse were true, then there 
would be arbitrage opportunities – the risk-free rate would be the wrong benchmark for calculating the risk-free 
premium; and investor could short securities and invest in the risk-free rate.   
 
Error Condition-#18: Short Positions Are Always Profitable.  
ICAPM and CML models/formulas implicitly and erroneously assume that all short positions are always 
profitable.   
 
Error Condition-#19: There Is No Correlation Between The Risk-Free Asset And The Capital Market; And No 
Correlation Between The Risk Free Asset And The Market Portfolio.      
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate only if and only if the risk free asset in the “market” 
are not correlated – this is error.  Also, researchers have often observed a negative correlation between the short 
term risk free rates and various proxies for the “Market” such as stock indices.  
 
Error Condition-#20: For Any Given Time Period, The Rate of Belief-Revision Of Investors Is Higher Than The 
Rate Of Diffusion Of Information In Capital Markets.   
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate only if and only if the investors’ average Rate of 
Belief-Revision (RB) is greater than Rate Of Diffusion Of Information (RID) in Capital Markets.  On the contrary, 
research has shown that many investors experience Inertia when faced with critical news about their portfolios.  
Anchoring effects and Framing Effects also prevent, delay or modify investors’ belief revision.   
The RID is the rate at which price-changing information is disseminated among investors, market makers and 
regulators in the market.  Clearly in today’s computerized world, information travels very quickly and is almost 
immediately available to many market participants upon release.  Also, various statutes and rules (such as 
Regulation FD) prevent or discourage insider trading.  Hence, in most markets RID is always greater than RB. 
 
Error Condition-#21: The Rate Of Substitution Of (A Position In) The “Market” With (A Position In) Any Asset 
Is Directly Proportional To The Risk Free Rate.         
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate only if and only if the investors’ average 
Rate Of Substitution of (a position in) the “Market” with (a position in) any asset (Ra; expressed as a 
percentage) is directly proportional to the Risk Free Rate (Rf).  This is a necessary condition because an investor 
can hold only a proxy of the Market portfolio (referred to as “Market Portfolio”) and if Ra/Rf < 0, then i) 
increases in risk will not be matched by increases in expected return, ii) there will be arbitrage opportunities 
because arbitrageurs will short the Market portfolio and buy risk free securities when yields of risk free 
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securities are rising, iii) the Market Portfolio will no longer reflect the most optimal portfolio for the average 
investor; iv) increases in the risk free rate without any asset substitution will increase the investor’s margin costs 
and expected returns and result in mispricing, v) the investors’ indifference between holding the market 
portfolio and holding other assets must be constant or relatively constant in order to derive the cost of capital via 
ICAPM and IAPT.   
 
Error Condition-#22: The Rate Of Intertemporal Substitution Of (A Position In) The “Market” With (A Position 
In) Any Asset Inversely Proportional To “The Risk-Premium”.         
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate only if and only if the Rate Of Substitution 
(replacement) of a position in the “Market” with (a position in) any asset (Ra) is inversely proportional to the 
Risk Premium (Rp).   
This is a necessary condition because an investor can hold only a proxy of the Market portfolio (referred 
to as “Market Portfolio”) and if Ra/Rp < 0, then: i) increases in risk will not be matched by increases in 
expected return; and ii) there will be arbitrage opportunities because arbitrageurs will short the Market portfolio 
and buy combinations of securities and risk free securities that will provide the highest risk premium when 
yields of risk free securities are rising; and iii) the Market Portfolio will no longer reflect the most optimal 
portfolio for the average investor.  However, this condition can never occur because it implies that the average 
investor.   
  
Error Condition-#23: The Average Investor’s Rate Of Substitution Of (A Position In) The “Market” With A 
Position In Any Asset Is Always Greater Than The Average Investor’s Rate Of Substitution Of An Equal  
Position In The “Risk-Free Asset” With (A Position In) Any Asset.         
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate only if and only if the average investor’s  Rate Of 
Substitution of a position in the “Market” with a position in any asset (Ra; expressed as a percentage) is always 
greater than the Rate Of Substitution of a position in the “Risk Free Asset” with a position in any asset (Rr; 
expressed as a percentage).  This condition ensures and implies that any investor is generally risk averse and is 
more likely to switch from the Market Portfolio to an asset A, than from a risk free asset to A in any market.  
Hence, the indifference curve of the risk free asset and the Market Portfolio must be downward sloping.    
 
Error Condition-#24: The Investor’s Actual And Marginal Borrowing Rate Is Irrelevant To His/Her Expected 
Return From Any Asset/Portfolio.    
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate if and only if the average investor’s marginal 
borrowing rate is irrelevant to his/her expected return.  ICAPM and CML don’t incorporate investors’ Marginal 
Borrowing Costs.  Most IAPT models also don’t incorporate the average investor’s Marginal Borrowing costs 
and changes in such costs over time.  This condition cannot be feasible because, any rational or irrational 
investor will typically consider his/her marginal borrowing costs (including margin costs in securities accounts) 
- such investments may require additional capital and thus borrowing (as in futures accounts or real estate 
development projects or acquisitions of assets).   
 
Error Condition-#25: Investors And Traders Don’t Experience Regret; And Regret Does Not Affect Investor’s 
Expected Returns.      
ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas can be accurate if and only if the average investor or trader does not 
experience Regret, and Regret does not affect their expected returns.  ICAPM, IAPT and CML completely omit 
Regret.  There is a substantial literature on the effects of Regret on human decision making – extendible to 
consumption choices and portfolio selection/re-balancing decisions.  Hence, this condition is not feasible.   
 
Error Condition-#26:  For Any Asset, The Average Investor’s Marginal Propensity-To-Substitute (For Any 
Other Asset) Is Irrelevant To Calculation Of Its Expected Return.      
On the contrary, the average investor’s Marginal propensity-to-substitute any asset is highly relevant to both the 
investor’s horizon, opportunity costs, indifference to other assets/opportunities and thus, his/her expected 
returns.  Hence, ICAPM, IAPT and CML models/formulas are very inaccurate   
 
Error Condition-#27: Expected Returns Are Only In The Form Of Cash; Investors Don’t Experience Any 
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Positive Utility From Holding Assets.         
On the contrary, it has been documented in the literature that investors can and do gain non-monetary utility 
from holding specific assets and specific combinations of assets.  Such non-monetary utility is also part of 
investor’s return from holding the asset, but is not incorporated into ICAPM, CML and most IAPT models.   
 
Error Condition-#28: There Is No Or Minimal Correlation Between The Asset-Beta And The Risk Free Rate.              
On the contrary, the Betas of some companies are highly correlated with the risk-free rate and this renders the 
ICAPM and CML inaccurate.  Such companies include finance companies, banks, mortgage REITs, etc..  If the 
Beta is correlated with the Risk-Free rate, then the Risk Premium will be distorted and inaccurate, and some of 
the terms in the ICAPM and CML formula will also be distorted.     
 
Error Condition-#29: In The IAPT, The Nature Of The Relationships Indicated By The Regression Coefficients 
Remains Constant Over Time; And For All Assets, There Is Minimal Multi-Collinearity Among Factors.           
On the contrary, the relationships indicated by the IAPT regression co-efficients are very dynamic and change 
constantly – some change continuously.  Also, for any asset, there is often substantial multi-collinearity among 
the regression factors.  Hence, IAPT is inaccurate.      
 
Error Condition-#30: In The IAPT, The First Derivative Of The Number Of Factors With Respect To The R
2
 Of 
The Equation, Is Constant.                   
The IAPT models erroneously assume that the first derivative of the number of factors with the R
2
 of the IAPT 
regression equation remains constant over time – ie. that R2/n = 0, where n is the number of factors.  
 
Error Condition-#31: The Risk-Free Rate Always Adequately Incorporates Inflation Risk And Horizon Risk; Or 
There Is No Inflation Or Deflation   
On the contrary, the Risk-Free Rate does not always incorporate inflation risk and horizon risk – ie. the 
inflation protected US Treasury securities.  Given such omission, the Risk Premium will always be inaccurate 
and the ICAPM and CML are inaccurate.  Most asset pricing models don’t incorporate the effects of inflation, 
which in emerging economies can range from 10% to 3,000% annually.  Inflation/deflation: a) affects investor 
expectations of asset returns, and asset prices, b) inflation reduces investors’ real returns, c) affects the 
possibility and availability of an efficient hedge for investments, d) affects investor current and future 
consumption, demand for goods and services, output, interest rates and availability of capital.   Hence, most 
asset pricing models are grossly mis-specified. 
 
Error Condition-#32: The Investor’s Investment Horizon Does Not Matter; And The Changes In the Investor’s 
Preferences And Risk Tolerance Do Not Matter; Intertemporal Risk And Benefits Can Be Defined Solely In 
Terms Of Standard Deviation, Mean Return, And Consumption   
Investors’ investment horizons matter and affect their expected returns because there are opportunity costs, 
Regret and utility/disutility from holding assets.  ICAPM, IAPT and CML are defined only with respect to 
specific horizons, and don’t account for changes in investor horizons.  In most asset pricing models, the 
indicator of consumer/investor state and Preferences is Utility, which is expressed primarily in terms of standard 
deviation, means and consumption.  This approach is incorrect.  Investors’ “preferences” and “States” can also 
be expressed with other metrics such as Regret, Opportunity Costs, downside Risk, Willingness-To-Accept-
Losses, etc..   
 
Error Condition-#33: All Markets Are Efficient In All Consecutive Periods; And The “No-Arbitrage” Condition 
Exists In Consecutive Time Intervals 
There has been significant research that has proved that markets can be, and are inefficient.  The main problem 
is that research on market efficiency has always erroneously assumed constant knowledge and unity of opinions 
among market participants and regulators; and that all existing market inefficiencies are instantly recognized and 
taken advantage of by market participants.  In reality, there are: a) significant differences in knowledge of 
various classes of market participants – individual investors, traders, etc., b) not all market inefficiencies are 
identified and taken advantage of -  due to knowledge limitations, availability of capital, time, regulations,  
Regret, Risk Aversion, inaccurate computer models, etc., c) the sheer volume and instantaneous changes in 
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psychological states of investors and continuous revisions of investor beliefs, creates significant differences in 
opinion and hence, arbitrage opportunities.  
 
Error Condition-#34: There is Equilibrium In Financial Markets.  
Most asset pricing models erroneously assume some degree of “equilibrium” in the economy and in some 
markets.  Contrary to generally accepted assumptions, there cannot be any “equilibrium” in financial markets 
because of the following reasons: a) there are instantaneous changes in investor perceptions, aspirations and 
beliefs about futures states, such that even dynamic equilibrium cannot exist; b) the definitions of demand and 
supply are often based partly or wholly on the amount of capital in the market, but does not include the amount 
of capital that is potentially available to all market participants, c) the existence of derivatives eliminates the 
possibility of equilibrium, d) the possibility of shorting securities and the interest charge for short positions 
eliminate the possibility of equilibrium, e) inflation (particularly in emerging market economies) has a 
significant but un-recognized effects on asset prices and asset values.    
 
Given that none of the above mentioned conditions are feasible, all or most existing asset pricing 
models are inaccurate.  This has substantial implications for asset management, dividend policy, capital 
budgeting and risk management.    
 
4. The Consumption-Savings-Investment-Production Dichotomy Is Inaccurate. 
During the last one hundred years, Economists and central bankers have built most of their models and analysis 
on the Consumption-Savings-Investment-production (the “CSIP”) dichotomy which treats each of the four 
factors as an almost unique “domain” of analysis (and does not focus on the inter-connectedness of the four 
factors); and which includes supply-side and demand-side analysis.  However, the following economic 
catastrophes have proven that the CSIP is inefficient and flawed in many ways:    
 
i) The Asian financial crisis of the 1990s.  
ii) The collapse of the LDC debt market in the mid-1990s. 
iii) The US recession of the early 1990s.  
iv) The stagnation of the growth of the Asian Tigers.    
v) The lack of improvement of the quality of life in most large developing countries (India, China, 
Brazil, and Indonesia) despite reported growth in their GDP/GNP.    
vi) Significant Trade Deficits in many countries during the last ten years.    
vii) The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US during 2005-2010; and the collapse of asset securitization 
markets in the US during 2008-2009; and the insolvency of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US.  
viii) The global financial crisis that began in 2007.  
ix) The failure of government stimulus programs in the EU, US, Japan and other countries during 2008-
2012.   
x) The economic problems in Greece, Ireland, Iceland and Spain during 2008-2012 (bailout of Greece 
by the EU; and downgrading of Spain’s debt to below-investment grade).  
xi) The economic problems in Latin American countries during the 1990s.   
xii) Significant increases in amounts of government debt in many countries during the last ten years.   
xiii) Un-recorded inflation in many countries; and continuing hyper-inflation in many developing 
countries.    
xiv) Under-developed or non-existent real estate markets in many countries.   
xv) High unemployment in many countries during the last ten years.  
xvi) The inaccuracy of the major rating agencies which contributed to many financial failures, and to 
market participants’ inability to properly assess risk.  
xvii) The adverse effects of the fixed exchange rate of the Chinese currency (Yuan). 
xviii) The loan losses incurred by Japanese banks during the 1990s.    
xix) The “informal black-market” economies in many developing countries.    
xx) The last-resort “dollarization” of the economies of many developing countries.    
xxi) The Russian financial crisis of 1998.  
xxii) The Nigerian financial crisis of 2005-2012. 
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xxiii) The crash of the US technology stock market in 2000.  
xxiv) The crash of Chinese stock markets during 2015.  
xxv) The sovereign debt crisis of Greece, Italy and Spain during 2010-2015.  
 
The CSIP dichotomy has always been used, and Consumption has always been analyzed from the 
perspective of the household without detailed analysis of the nuances of decision making and the psychological 
benefits/costs of the allocation of wealth.  Several studies that have analyzed the differences between 
consumption (of different goods/services) and investment conclusively show that consumption and 
investment/Savings patterns are not uniform across goods/services, financial products, time, industries and 
location; and that income and savings patterns are not uniform across time, region, industry, and age, both in 
terms of the actual dollar amounts and the rationale for such behaviors and the utility/disutility derived from 
such behaviors.  Hence, the terms “aggregate consumption” and “aggregate Investment” and “aggregate income 
are misnomers within the context of asset pricing.    
The Consumption-Savings-Investment-Production (CSIP) framework and dichotomy/debate may have 
been useful in past eras where the following conditions existed:    
1) Information was limited and information diffusion was much slower – there was no internet, and it was 
difficult to obtain statistics about markets and products/services, and to compare.      
2) There was more uniformity of products and services – today modern technology enables companies to 
provide a much wider variety of goods and services at lower per-unit costs. 
3) Payment systems were limited – today there is a proliferation of payment systems 
4) Entertainment was limited – today, the form, access and pricing of entertainment are drastically different and 
there has been an exponential proliferation of the types and volume of entertainment.  
5) For any given product, the sources of utility/disutility were limited. 
6) Loan volumes were much smaller – today, loan volumes in various countries are much larger.   
7) There were fewer complex financial instruments. 
8) Stable taxation – taxation was simpler.  Today, taxation (personal, business, income, capital gains, etc.) has 
become very complex.  
9) There were fewer ways to hedge financial risk and operational risk. 
10) The traditional central banking tools of monetary policy were more effective. 
11) Government deficits were generally smaller.   
 
 
4.1. Savings.  
Savings is much less of an important economic indicator for several reasons.  First, there are now a 
wider variety of sources of capital for investment and lending.  Companies, foundations, pension funds, 
insurance companies and governments (local, state and federal) now have active treasury functions and routinely 
invest in all types of securities across different maturities and countries, and have essentially replaced household 
savings as the primary source of capital.  Secondly, there has been a proliferation of new forms of financial 
products (such as 100% LTV loans; and long-term leasing) that don’t require any equity investment by 
households or companies.  These loans have substantially reduced the incentive to save and the importance of 
savings.  Thirdly, the prevalence and rapid growth of online and non-internet social networks has reduced the 
“need” for household savings –if people can borrow short-term loans from friends and obtain other goods 
(temporary housing, use of vehicles, etc.) from friends, then the need to save for emergencies and contingencies 
declines.  Fourth, the growth of finance companies that provide short term loans to individuals has also reduced 
the need for, and relevance of savings as an economic indicator.   
Fifth, there has been an increasing greater divergence between savings and consumption during the last 
twenty years - savings in the traditional sense does not equate to changes in consumption patterns in the future – 
rich and super-rich households still borrow for various purposes.  Hence the relationship between savings and 
consumption or investment has become much more tenuous than in the past due to changes in the financial 
services sector, and the utility of debt/borrowing.   
Sixth, the utility of savings has declined during the last twenty years.  In the past, savings provided 
some assurance of a safe retirement and ability to manage contingencies and pay for household necessities such 
as education and healthcare costs.  However, un-recorded excess inflation in developed and developing 
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countries (which has been non-uniform across industries and goods), higher taxes, financial contagion, volatility 
in capital markets and declining financial stability of banks has reduced the utility derived from savings.   
Seventh, the increase in government financial support for senior citizens particularly in developed 
countries has reduced the incentive to save and the utility of savings.  Most of this government support is funded 
by increased taxes.  Eighth, the proliferation of insurance and reinsurance products (for long term care, senior 
citizen’s housing, assisted living, etc..) has reduced the incentive to save money and the utility of savings.  
Ninth, “lending” by households (via the purchase of bonds and notes) is often not perceived as a form of savings 
(both by households and central banks that calculate national accounts).  There is increasing blurring of the 
differences between “household Investment” and “household savings”.  Tenth, the perceived utility of a 
securities brokerage account is very different form the perceived utility of a traditional savings account at a bank 
(and from that of home equity).  Given that the trend in consumer financial services has been a major shift away 
from savings accounts to brokerage accounts, the utility gained from savings has clearly declined.   
 
The transferability of the utility of savings has declined during the last twenty years primarily because of: 
a) Substantial divergences among individuals about the value and utility of traditional savings. 
b) Substantial divergences among individuals about the utility of traditional measures of wealth (cash, 
securities, home equity, intangibles, savings accounts, gold/silver, etc.). 
 
 
The utility of savings is derived as follows.  
 
Let:  
Us = utility of household Savings 
Is = PV of savings. 
Xe = PV of expected future expenses not covered by savings.  
Xu = PV of unexpected expenses.  
Xi = PV of inflation effects.  
Lf = Negative effects of general instability of financial system on savings and home equity – similar to Regret. 
Vh = Present value of Expected home equity.  
t = time to death (years) 
r = discount rate 
Ig = PV of expected government support for senior citizens.  
Ii = PV of third-party insurance benefits. 
Is = availability of short term un-secured loans in the future 
 
Us = exp[∫0
t
 (Is –Xe –Xu–Xi–Lf+Vh-Ig-Ii) dt] 
 
This implies that most of the utility functions derived for savings and investment in the existing literature are 
inaccurate and insufficient to describe the dynamics of real world conditions.   
 
4.2. Aggregate Investment And Investment.      
Aggregate Investment is also a much less useful economic indicator for many reasons.  Aggregate Investment 
lumps industry investment together with consumer investment.  Aggregate Investment does not distinguish 
between differences in investment objectives and the structure of the investment (which is increasingly critical 
point of differentiation).  Secondly, Aggregate Investment is not adjusted for the duration of the investment, 
which is a critical element of the economy.  Third, Aggregate Investment does not reflect government subsidies 
and incentives for both households and companies – this omission distorts true nature of economic activity.  
Fourth, Aggregate Investment does not distinguish among capital investment and investments in securities, and 
investment in intangibles.     
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4.3. Intangibles - The Production And Consumption Of Intangibles Differs From General Consumption And 
Traditional Production And Investment.     
Wyatt (2005), and Wong & Wong (2001) found significant economic and behavioral effects from 
accounting recognition/non-recognition of intangibles.  According to Salinas (2009) (and other studies), 
Intangible Assets constitute 60% to 75% of the market capitalization value of the major stock indices in the 
World; and thus changes in the disclosed values of Intangible assets can affect individual and group psychology.  
Corrado, Hulten & Sichel (2011), and Slaughter (2013) found that Intangible contribute substantially to the US 
economy.  At the individual level, Intangibles also include Social Capital and personality traits that account for 
success or failure in business transactions and personal relationships. Unlike traditional goods, the consumption 
of Intangibles occurs over many periods, and can yield future utility in the form of: a) home equity, b) social 
networks, c) social capital and Reputation; d) peace of mind; e) reduced Regret; f) skills which improve labor 
mobility; g) second income; etc.   
 The production of intangibles differs from traditional production.  Substantial and increasing 
percentages of Intangibles are produced in the services sector, or through services (non-manufacturing) activities 
such as software development, advertising, promotions and social media networks.  The “consumption” of 
Intangibles also differs from traditional consumption in terms of timing, place and frequency. In many instances, 
Intangibles production is involuntary or incidental/tangential.    The Intangibles production decision is debated 
within the household and companies, and is sometimes a major component of the identity and self-worth of such 
units.  Hence, there are more psycho-social processes (internal and external) associated with Intangibles 
consumption; than is indicated in the existing literature.   
Similarly, the Intangibles consumption decision is debated within the household, and is a major 
component of the identity and self-worth of the household.  Hence, there are more psycho-social processes 
(internal and external) associated with Intangibles consumption; than is indicated in the existing literature.      
Unlike traditional goods and traditional Savings, Intangibles consumption has substantial, sometimes 
irreversible and very observable effects on the social networks of households. Furthermore, most analysis of 
Consumption and savings don’t account for the fact that behavioral factors such as shocks (loss of income; ill 
health, property damage), and changes in tastes/preferences of households, etc., are critical determinants of 
Intangibles consumption.  Unlike traditional goods and traditional Savings, Intangibles consumption has 
substantial, sometimes irreversible and very observable effects on the social networks of households.           
De Roon & Szymanowska (2012) found that when U.S. stock portfolios are sorted according to size; 
momentum; transaction costs; market-to-book, investment-to-assets, and return-on-assets (ROA) ratios; and 
industry classification, the portfolios show considerable levels and variation of return predictability, that is 
inconsistent with asset pricing models, such that the risk premium predicted by asset pricing models is not 
sufficient compensation for systematic risk.  In addition to short sales constraints, holding periods and 
transaction costs, the asset pricing anomalies stated in De Roon & Szymanowska (2012), Hodrick &  Zhang 
(2001), Maslov & Rytchkov (_____), and Lewellen & Nagel (2006) can also be explained by differences in 
perceptions of, and amounts of Intangibles (ie. valuation, volatility; risk).   
 
4.4. Leisure Differs From General Consumption, Investment And Production.     
The substantial differences between the consumption of Leisure and traditional consumption, have not 
been properly addressed in the existing literature on asset pricing.  Unlike traditional goods, the consumption of 
Leisure occurs over many periods, and can yield future utility in the form of: a) social networks, b) social 
capital, c) peace of mind, ) Reputation; e) reduced Regret; f) second income – from additional skills; etc.  In 
many instances, the Leisure consumption decision is debated within the household, and is a major component of 
the identity and self-worth of the household.  Hence, there are more psycho-social processes (internal and 
external) associated with Leisure consumption; than is indicated in the existing literature.  The nature and timing 
of Leisure activities have changed substantially since the mid 1990s and the advent of Broadband Internet.  
Information about more Leisure opportunities are now available on the Internet, which also provides various 
platforms for matching individuals/households with low-cost leisure opportunities.  Movies, Games, group 
memberships and social networks are readily available on the Internet.  These trends have generally resulted in 
segmentation of Leisure, and declining costs of Leisure for many classes/types of Leisure activities.  
Also, more Leisure activities are or can become income producing activities or “home production” – 
this is partly because: i) issues like marketing, advertising, distribution, customer services and quality have all 
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been made cheaper and more available to small businesses by the growth of the Internet; ii) un-even growth in 
income and living expenses (across industries, regions; households) and shocks (such as the subprime crisis) 
have compelled adults to seek second incomes. Aguiar & Hurst (2007). Gelber & Mitchell (2012). Gronau 
(1977).  Unlike traditional goods and traditional Savings, Leisure consumption has substantial, sometimes 
irreversible and very observable effects on the social networks and future allocations and consumption choices 
of households. Furthermore, most analysis of Consumption, Investment and savings dont account for the fact 
that behavioral factors such as shocks (loss of income; ill health, property damage), and changes in 
tastes/preferences of households, etc., are critical determinants of Leisure consumption.  Unlike traditional 
goods and traditional Savings, Leisure consumption has substantial, sometimes irreversible and very observable 
effects on the social networks of households.           
In addition to short sales constraints and transaction costs, the asset pricing anomalies stated in De Roon 
& Szymanowska (2012), Hodrick &  Zhang (2001), Maslov & Rytchkov (_____), and Lewellen & Nagel (2006) 
can also be explained by differences in perceptions of, and amounts of Leisure at the individual, household and 
company levels (ie. value of Leisure; gains/losses from Leisure activities; risk; etc.).   
 
4.5. The Consumption Of Housing Differs From General Consumption And Traditional Savings.     
Another critical issue is that the substantial differences between the consumption of housing and 
traditional consumption, have not been properly addressed in the existing literature on asset pricing.  Housing 
accounts for 25%-40% of the economies of many developed countries and third world countries.  Furthermore, 
housing accounts for more than half of the total Wealth of most households in most developed countries, and is 
the biggest investment decision made by many households.  El-Attar & Poschke (2011). Housing-related 
monthly expenditures account for 20%-40% of the total monthly household expenditures in most countries.  The 
concept of “Housing” can also be extended to companies, for which occupancy costs (rent; maintainance; 
overages; utilities; property taxes; fees; etc.) account for 15%-50% of monthly operating expenses. Yang (2009) 
contrasted the consumption of housing and that of traditional goods.  In addition to the differences noted by 
Yang (2009), the following are other critical differences among the consumption of housing and the 
consumption of traditional goods, and traditional Savings.   
Unlike traditional goods, the Housing unit is typically fixed in time, space and form.  The Buyer usually 
cannot change the configuration of, or move the housing unit.  The transaction costs and search costs for 
buying/selling housing units are relatively large, and can vary drastically across geographical regions and time.  
The purchase of a housing unit almost always involves a mortgage loan (which incurs additional search costs, 
processing costs, reputation costs, household dynamics, and commitment costs).  In most jurisdictions, the 
purchase of a housing unit incurs future property taxes. The consumption of housing is highly regulated at the 
local, state and federal levels – by zoning laws, building codes, environmental laws, ordinances, mortgage laws, 
etc..   
Unlike traditional goods, the purchase of housing typically involves as much “consumption” as the sale 
of the same housing unit.  This is henceforth referred to as “asymmetrical two-sided housing transaction 
consumption”.   
Unlike traditional goods, the consumption of housing occurs over many periods, and can yield future 
utility in the form of: a) home equity, b) social networks, c) social capital, d) peace of mind, e) reduced Regret, 
etc.  In many instances, the housing consumption decision is debated within the household, and is a major 
component of the identity and self-worth of the household.  Hence, there are more psycho-social processes 
(internal and external) associated with housing consumption; than is indicated in the existing literature.   
Unlike traditional goods and traditional Savings, Housing consumption has substantial, sometimes 
irreversible and very observable effects on the social networks of households.           
Furthermore, most analysis of Consumption and savings dont account for the fact that behavioral factors 
such as shocks (loss of income; ill health, property damage), and changes in tastes/preferences of households, 
etc., are critical determinants of housing consumption.  Traditional analysis of Consumption and Savings dont 
differentiate among housing as physical space/shelter, housing as “expectations” and investment; housing as 
“conformance/status”, and housing as a bundle of psychological/social goods.  Traditional analysis of 
Consumption and Savings dont analyze  the various effects of debt and access to credit on the consumption of 
housing and non-housing goods.  All else held constant, the consumption of housing varies drastically among 
different types of housing (condos vs. coops. vs. townhouses vs. rental units vs. single family homes).   
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Housing remains a basic element of human needs and economic activity but its ramifications and 
somewhat unique results are not fully understood.  There remains several paradoxes in the housing markets that 
transcend location, time, wealth and household structure such as the following: a) why households that rent 
housing units are not taxed but households that own homes are taxed without any consideration of how the 
household financed the home purchase, and regardless of whether or not home-ownership is less or more 
beneficial for the economy; b) for some wealthy households, the stock of housing is potentially “infinite” if its 
assumed that exchange costs (costs to change housing units) are relatively minimal, and the utility of exchanges 
is substantial and transferable; c) rent controls are not enforced fully such that even middle income households 
benefit from rent control, d) rent control/stabilization laws are almost “permanent” in most large cities in 
developed countries, and many of the specific rent control mechanisms are not designed to vary significantly 
with economic cycles or time, e) in most countries, the federal/central governments continue to delegate 
construction/maintenance of housing almost entirely to the private sector even though its apparent that private 
companies don’t have sufficient incentives to provide truly affordable housing, f) federal and state governments 
give out tax credits to developer to build affordable housing, but don’t give tax credits to house holds to limit or 
optimize their consumption of housing (there is huge “housing waste” caused by empty nesters and mismatch of 
housing needs and housing supply), g) in many countries, despite the critical nature of housing, governments are 
hesitant to actively participate directly in the housing sector, and government activity in the housing sector is 
limited to income support (housing vouchers, free emergency housing; tax credits) and offering free land, and to 
a lesser extent, low-cost financing); h) with all other factors assumed to be constant and similar across housing 
types (including price), the consumption of housing varies drastically among different types of housing (condos 
vs. coops. vs. townhouses vs. rental units vs. single family homes 
In addition to short-sales constraints and transaction costs, the asset pricing anomalies stated in De Roon 
& Szymanowska (2012), Hodrick & Zhang (2001), Maslov & Rytchkov (_____), and Lewellen & Nagel (2006) 
can also be explained by differences in perceptions of, and amounts of Housing at the individual and household 
levels (ie. value of Housing; gains/losses from Housing; risk; etc.); and the amount of occupancy costs for 
commercial real estate at the company level.   
 
5. Regret Theory, Prospect Theory And Behavior-Based Asset Pricing Models. 
Given the many problems inherent in existing asset-pricing Models, Regret Theory is a viable 
alternative to decision model.  This is because Regret Theory incorporates many of the behavioral/psychological 
issues that ICAPM and IAPT Models do not or cannot capture – such as flexibility, Real Options, Regret 
minimization; reversibility of decisions, dynamic cost-of-capital, Framing effects, etc..  This section surveys 
some critical literature on Regret Theory to show how it has been used in asset pricing and for project 
selection/evaluation.     
Bonomo, Garcia, Meddahi & Tédongap (2011); Hirshleifer (2001); Ray & Robson (2012); Jamison & 
Wegener (Nov. 2009); Han & Yang (2013); Barberis, Huang & Santos (2001); Korniotis & Kumar (2011); El-
Attar & Poschke (2011); Berkelaar & Kouwenberg (2009); Solnik & Zuo (2012), have analyzed the effect of 
individual and group behaviors on asset pricing.  Solnik & Zuo (2012), Bonomo, Garcia, Meddahi & Tédongap 
(2011); Lia & Yang (2013); Dodonova & Khoroshilov (______); Barberis & Huang (2008); Hung & Wang 
(2005); De Giorgi, Hens & Mayer (2007); Yogo (2008); and Barberis, Huang & Santos (2001), developed 
behavior-based asset pricing models, which were inspired by Regret Theory or Prospect Theory.  
Nasiry & Popescu (2009) analyzed the effects of anticipated regret on consumer decisions, firm profits 
and policies, in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations; and found that advance 
purchases trigger action regret if valuations are lower than the price paid, and delaying purchase causes inaction 
regret.  Nasiry & Popescu (2009) developed a Regret threshold above which firms should only spot-sell to 
homogeneous markets, and otherwise advance selling is optimal.  Nasiry & Popescu (2009) also found that the 
effect of regret on profits depends on the type of regret, market structure and the firm's pricing power - and 
Action regret lowers the optimal profits of a price-setting firm in homogeneous markets, while inaction regret 
has the opposite effect.  According to Nasiry & Popescu (2009), firms can benefit from regret by creating a 
buying frenzy, where consumers purchase in advance at negative surplus; and Action regret can be profitable if 
high valuation consumers are more regretful, or if the firm is price-constrained.   
Michenaud & Solnik (2008) applied Regret Theory to derive closed-form solutions to optimal currency 
hedging choices – they theorized that Investors experience regret of not having chosen the ex-post optimal 
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hedging decision; and thus, investors anticipate their future experience of regret and incorporate it in their 
objective function.  Michenaud & Solnik (2008) derived a model of financial decision-making with two 
components of risk: traditional risk (volatility) and regret risk; and their results contradicted traditional expected 
utility, loss aversion, and Dis-appointment-Aversion theories. 
Ghosh (1993) used Regret Theory to explain some survey results on managers' dividend policy 
decisions under uncertainty; and postulates that (1) the decision to pay dividends and simultaneously raise 
venture capital from external sources is attributable to managerial aversion for regret at the failure of a risky 
investment opportunity implemented with internal funds generated by a conservative dividend policy; and (2) 
the decision to support dividends with borrowed funds when earnings are declining is motivated by the prospect 
that an improvement in the firm's financial condition will make the managers proud that their judgment has 
helped avert a potential crisis for the firm without any wealth loss to its shareholders. 
Muermann, Mitchell & Volkman (2006) showed that anticipated disutility from regret can have a 
significant and drastic effect on investment choices.  They analyzed and modeled how plan-participants’ asset 
allocation decisions in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan might vary with their preferences about risk and 
Regret.  Muermann, Mitchell & Volkman (2006) found that the Regret-Averse investor will typically hold more 
stock than a risk-averse investor when the equity premium is low but less stock when the equity premium is 
high; and that Regret increases the regret-averse investor’s willingness-to-pay for a guarantee when the portfolio 
is relatively risky, but decreases it when the portfolio is relatively safe.   
Brocas & Carrillo (2005) analyzed decision making by a hyperbolic discounting agent; and showed that 
the agent may rationally decide to consume with negative expected NPV only to prevent himself from 
consuming in the future which could be profitable from a future perspective but highly detrimental from the 
current viewpoint. Comparative statics reveal that the value of information is U-shaped.    
Nwogugu (2006) introduced new models of Regret and Willingness To Accept Losses (WTAL).  The 
Nwogugu (2006) Regret model can be used for project evaluation/selection.    
Dodonova (2009), DeKay (2009), Bleichrodt, Cillo & Diecidue (2010), all analyzed the use of Regret 
Theory for project evaluation and project selection.  Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair & Berns (2008), 
and Canessa, Alemanno, Motterlini, et. al. (2009), and Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu (2007) analyzed neuro-
biological Regret.   
Gollier & Salanié (2006); Sagi & Friedland (2007); Wang, Triantaphyllou & Kujawski (2008);  Huang, 
Tzeng & Liu (2009); and Laciana & Weber (2008) analyzed Regret.  Frehen, Hoevenaars, Palm & Schotman 
(2008) analyzed regret aversion in the retirement investment decision of defined contribution plan participants; 
and developed and priced a look-back option on a life annuity contract.   
 
 
6. Definitions. 
Definition-1: The Consumption-Savings-Investment-Production Dichotomy (the “CSIP”) is irrelevant because 
all four asset-pricing approaches are elements of one Unified Intertemporal Wealth-Allocation Decision 
(“UIWD”) by an investor or household.  UIWD encompasses all the elements of the household’s or the firm’s 
simultaneous decisions about Consumption, Savings, Investment, Taxation, Production, Leisure, Intangibles and 
Housing.  The investor or head of the household typically budgets for each period (weekly or monthly or 
annually) either mentally, or in physical form (written budgets).  Such budgets are often discussed with others – 
including spouses/partners, investment advisors or other members of the household.  The investor/household-
head decides how much of his/her wealth to allocate to Consumption, Savings, Investment, Production, Leisure, 
Intangibles and Housing.  Such decisions may be revised/updated during the subject period, and the initial 
allocation decision is followed almost immediately by more detailed sub-allocations within each of the six 
domains (Consumption – household necessities, luxuries, etc.; Investment - production, amount of work time, 
over-time, bonuses, savings, amounts to allocate to or withdraw from various savings programs, tax 
considerations, etc.; Taxes – capital gains taxes, income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, etc.; Leisure – 
entertainment, vacation, etc.; Intangibles – training, conferences, professional certifications, cost of 
patents/trademarks, etc.; Housing – rent, mortgage payments, maintenance, etc.).    
 
Defition-2: Total Wealth (W(.)) includes monetary and non-monetary wealth (time; Intangibles; Intellectual 
Property Rights; social capital; contingent rights; utility from deferral of obligations; etc.).  Investable Wealth 
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includes wealth that can be readily converted into cash or can be readily exchanged for other assets.  
 
Definition-3: Housing for the agent refers to all costs necessary for tenancy or ownership of a housing unit 
(individuals) or office space (companies) – such as rent, property taxes, mortgages payments, home insurance, 
maintenance costs, etc.  Housing for the corporate entity refers to all costs necessary for physical facilities for its 
operations, and include rent, property taxes, mortgages payments, home insurance, maintenance costs, etc.  
 
Definition-4: Leisure for the agent includes all costs for leisure and entertainment that are not necessary for day-
to-day living, and include – entertainment costs, vacation time, etc..  Leisure for the corporate entity include all 
costs for entertainment and for employee leisure, such as corporate events, wellness programs, employee 
vacation time, etc..   
 
Definition-5: For the agent, Intangibles includes all costs for developing or changing intangible property such as 
training expenses, costs for networking and special events, personal debt capacity, patent/trademark costs, costs 
for preparing proprietary data, etc..   For the firm, Intangibles includes all costs for developing or changing 
intangible property such as training expenses, corporate debt capacity, costs for networking and special events, 
patent/trademark costs, costs for preparing proprietary data, etc.    
 
Definition-6: For the agent, Investment includes all traditional investment and savings activities and all forms of 
production and services activities because the agent is in effect investing time and Human Capital which 
provides returns in the form of salaries, and or royalties or fees or other remuneration.  For the firm, Investment 
includes all traditional investment and savings activities and all forms of non-leisure production and services 
because the firm is in effect investing money, time, Human Capital, equipment and other resources.  
 
Definition-7: For the agent, Taxes includes all traditional income taxes, capital gains taxes, property taxes and 
other taxes.  For the Firm, Taxes includes all traditional income taxes, capital gains taxes, property taxes and 
other taxes.  For the government, Taxes includes all tax incentives and tax abatements for traditional income 
taxes, capital gains taxes, property taxes and other taxes.  Taxes can be positive, as in when wealth is allocated 
for payment of taxes or when government provides tax incentives/benefits; or negative as in when an agent 
avoids/defers payment of taxes; or when government eliminates existing tax incentives/benefits.   
 
Definition-8: c, t, i, l, b and h are distinct single units of consumption, taxes, Investment, Leisure, Intangibles 
and Housing respectively.  
- < v, y, x, z, s and r < + are the numbers of units of Total Wealth allocated to Consumption, Taxes, 
Investment, Leisure, Intangibles and Housing respectively, in the periodic wealth allocation process.  These re-
allocations are effected with single-period or multi-period contracts.  Thus, the agent/investor can decide to 
forgo regular scheduled consumption (v can be negative); and the investor can decide to delay payment of taxes 
due, or implement tax reduction strategies (y can be negative); and can decide to withdraw  funds from his/her 
investment securities account (x can be negative), and can decide to take a vacation, reduce regular work hours 
or spend more leisure time instead of working (z can be negative). 
 
Definition-9: Markets are incomplete because there is intertemporal uncertainty (imperfect information about 
future states and preferences), there are contract enforcement costs, and the set of available contracts which can 
be used to transfer or re-allocate wealth across time is limited to those contracts that may match uncertain future 
states; and agents trade in both sequential spot markets and multi-period forward markets.  T is a block of time 
that contains discrete units of time each of which is t.   
 
 
Theorem-1: The Consumption-Investment-Savings-Production Dichotomy Is Irrelevant Because All Four 
factors Are Elements Of One Decision Process And Are Insufficient For Defining Real World Situations; 
And Any Asset Pricing Model Based Solely On One Or All Of These Four Factors Is Inaccurate.   
Proof: Prior theoretical and empirical asset pricing studies have un-necessarily focused on the four approaches 
which are erroneously assumed to be different – the consumption-based, the savings-based (or consumption-
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savings-based), investment-based and production-based approaches to asset pricing.  Basu (Oct. 2002).  Garnier, 
Nishimura & Venditti (2007).  Crossley & Low (Sept. 2006).  See the discussion above on the feasibility 
conditions for the CSIP framework.     
 
The UIWD is valid where the following conditions exist:   
1) Individuals’ Time and Knowledge have both monetary and non-monetary value.  The individual’s/investor’s 
Time and Knowledge are part of his/her Total Wealth.  
2) The capital markets are composed of firms that employ individuals based wholly or partly on their time, 
knowledge and effort.   
3) For any individual and for any time interval, production, investment, savings and consumption can produce 
the same types and magnitudes of utility and wealth.  
4) There are or may be opportunity costs for every allocation of an individual’s resources/Total-Wealth to either 
consumption, savings, production or investment.   
5) The individual’s or investor’s Marginal Rate of Intertemporal Substitution (MRIS) among any of production, 
investment, savings and consumption, changes in some proportion to his/her: i) Total Wealth, ii) Total 
Investable Wealth, iii) horizon.  Here the MRIS is the rate at which the individual re-allocates one unit of Total 
Wealth (which includes Investible Wealth, Non-monetary Wealth and Monetary Wealth) among consumption, 
savings, investment or production.       
6) Capital Markets are incomplete; and labor markets are also incomplete.   
7) There is never pure equilibrium in capital markets or labor markets.  
8) The household/investor derives the same types of utility/disutility from investments, products and traditional 
“goods”, such that there is minimal distinction between “consumption”, “investment” and “savings”. 
9) The household/investor derives the same types of utility/disutility from investment-products and traditional 
“goods” and “earnings” from work, such that there is minimal distinction among “consumption”, “investment” 
and “savings” and “production”. 
10) The indifference curve between any pair of the investor’s four allocation decision factors (consumption, 
savings, production and investment) is always downward-sloping.     
 
All of the above-mentioned conditions exist simultaneously in many markets.  □ 
 
 
7. The Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution Is Inaccurate.  
Other than the above, several authors have also noted the inaccuracy and inapplicability of the EIS. Guvenen 
(2006) attempted to reconcile two opposing views about the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) - 
empirical studies using aggregate consumption data typically find the EIS to be close to zero, whereas calibrated 
models designed to match growth and fluctuations facts typically require it to be close to one.  Guvenent (2006) 
noted that this contradiction is resolved when two kinds of heterogeneity are acknowledged: one, the majority of 
households do not participate in stock markets; and secondly, that the EIS increases with wealth. When Guvenen 
(2006) introduced these two features into a standard real business cycle model, its was noted that limited 
participation creates substantial wealth inequality as in the U.S. data; and as such the properties of aggregates 
directly linked to wealth (e.g., investment and output) are mainly determined by the (high-EIS) stockholders; 
and since consumption is much more evenly distributed than is wealth, estimation from aggregate consumption 
uncovers the low EIS of the majority (i.e., the poor).   
Havranek (2015) analyzed 2,735 (two thousand seven hundred and thirty five) estimates of the 
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution in consumption (EIS) that were derived in 169 (one hundred and sixty 
nine) published articles and found evidence of strong selective reporting wherein authors frequently discarded 
negative and insignificant estimates which in turn increased the mean estimate by about 0.5. Havranek (2015) 
noted that this “Reporting Bias” was more dominant than the effects of empirical methods used (with the 
exception of the choice between micro and macro data).  Most importantly, when Havranek (2015) corrected the 
mean for the Reporting Bias, for macro estimates the EIS obtained was zero even though the reported average t- 
statistics was two (2); but the corrected mean of micro estimates of the EIS for asset holders was around 0.3-0.4. 
Havranek (2015) concluded that estimated EIS that are greater than 0.8 are inconsistent with the bulk of the 
empirical evidence, and thus are wrong. 
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Wallenius (2011) considered two different skill accumulation technologies which are learning by doing 
and Ben-Porath type training. Wallenius (2011) noted that the effect of human capital accumulation in the form 
of learning-by-doing is to increase the labor supply elasticity estimate by a factor of 2.1 relative to the estimate 
that ignores human capital accumulation – all of which biases estimates of the EIS of Labor.  Okubo (2008) used 
a model with nonseparable and nonhomothetic preferences to estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
(EIS), and found that while the assumption of homotheticity is strongly rejected, the estimated IES is positive 
and significant.  Such empirical rejection of homotheticity is prime evidence that the EIS is wrong - because 
homotheticity is a major assumption underlying EIS.  Lybbert & McPeak (2012) estimated risk aversion and 
intertemporal substitution as distinct preferences using data from Kenyan herders, and based on the assumption 
of existence of Epstein and Zin recursive preferences.  Epstein and Zin [1989; Econometrica 57, 937–969], 
Lybbert & McPeak (2012) found that the assumption implicit in additive expected utility models that relative 
risk aversion (RRA) is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is wrong. Lybbert & 
McPeak (2012) also stated that their RRA and EIS estimates are consistent with a preference for the early 
resolution of uncertainty, which is caused by the instrumental value of early resolution of uncertainty; and this 
same preference pattern is consistent with asset smoothing in response to a dynamic asset threshold.  Such 
“early resolution” and “asset smoothing” trends/preferences render the EIS inaccurate because of the 
assumptions inherent in the definitions and calculation of EIS. Garcia, Renault & Semenov (2006) noted that 
although in the canonical CCAPM, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) is “constrained” to be the 
inverse of the EIS; for theoretical and empirical reasons the EIS and the RRA should be disentangled; and such 
disentangling may be achieved by replacing the future consumption stream not by a certainty equivalent of 
future utility, like in the recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin [1989. Econometrica, 57, 937–969], but by 
an exogenous reference level of consumption, which, in a recursive way, assesses the expected future 
consumption.  Garcia, Renault & Semenov (2006) observations imply that those methods of calculating the EIS 
by direct or indirect reference to the RRA, are wrong.  
  Giulano & Turnovsky (2003) noted that the constant elasticity utility function implies that the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, but empirical 
evidence suggests that this relationship may or may not hold, and thus studies of risk and growth should 
decouple these two parameters. Giulano & Turnovsky (2003) analyzed the “equilibrium” of a stochastically 
growing small open economy under general recursive preferences, and attempted to show that errors committed 
by using the constant elasticity utility function, even for small violations of the compatibility condition, can be 
substantial.  The Giulano & Turnovsky (2003) results cast substantial doubt on the validity of both the EIS, and 
the EIS-RRA relationship.   
Saltari & Ticchi (2007) analyzed the role of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution in a simple 
dynamic general equilibrium model of investment and savings, and found that risk aversion cannot by itself 
explain a negative relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty, because the effect of 
increased uncertainty on investment also depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Saltari & Ticchi 
(2007) also noted that the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty is positive even 
if agents are very risk averse, as long as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low- but this statement is a 
contradiction to their other observations. Saltari & Ticchi (2007) stated that a negative investment–uncertainty 
relationship requires that the relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are both 
relatively high or both relatively low – but either condition contravenes the very definition of both RRA and 
EIS.   
Lewis (1991) noted that empirical studies of the restrictions implied by the intertemporal capital asset 
pricing model across different asset markets have found conflicting evidence, and using data on foreign 
exchange, bonds, and equity returns, Lewis (1991) found that the tendency to reject the intertemporal 
consumption-based asset pricing relationship depends upon the inadequacy of an auxiliary assumption (that 
covariances of returns with consumption move in constant proportion over time), not necessarily the relationship 
itself. Stern (1997) noted that ecological economics is characterized by arguments concerning limits to 
substitution between inputs (energy, natural capital, etc., vs. manufactured capital, labor, etc.) in production and 
the implications these have for sustainability; and that various authors have also expressed concerns regarding 
limits to substitution in consumption, either between environmental assets and other goods or between basic 
needs commodities and other goods. Stern (1997) noted that the underlying theme is that individual 
commodities and other inputs have unique physical or other properties which make them poor substitutes, and 
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that many authors have argued for irreversibilities in consumption behavior. Kim & Lee (2007) analyzed on-the-
job human capital accumulation from the perspective of time invested for acquiring skills and learning by doing 
in an RBC model and shows that the inability to account for human capital accumulation leads to a substantial 
bias in conventional estimates of EIS.  Kim & Lee (2007) stated that their main results are based on the standard 
intuition that the opportunity cost of time invested in acquiring human capital moves pro-cyclically, so that on-
the-job time invested in acquiring human capital is “counter-cyclical”; and the true wage rate becomes less pro-
cyclical, while production hours become more pro-cyclical than total hours at work. 
  Lee (2008) noted that estimates of EIS obtained from standard life-cycle models are subject to a 
downward bias because they neglect the life-cycle and demographic patterns of on-the-job human capital 
investment. Lee (2008) stated that there was statistically significant evidence that conventional estimates of EIS 
for total hours at work are biased downward by about 20% at the intensive margin; and the corresponding EIS 
estimates for production hours are biased downward even more, which provides an explanation for why output 
fluctuation is greater than hours/employment fluctuation over the business cycle. Taking into account the fact 
that part of a worker's time at work goes to acquiring human capital in addition to his main task of producing 
goods, Lee (2008) attempted to extend the standard life-cycle model to include time spent on investing in on-
the-job human capital and proposed a new framework for identifying the EIS.   
 
Theorem 2: The Elasticity Of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS) Is Inaccurate.   
Proof: Many studies have empirically and theoretically derived very different estimates for the Elasticity of 
Intertemporal Substitution (EIS). Giuliano & Turnovsky (2003).  Crossley & Low (Sept. 2006).  The EIS is 
deficient because it addresses only substitution between only two factors/goods in only one domain (typically 
the consumption domain, or production domain or investment domain).  The EIS does not address the UIWD 
which refers to re-allocation of wealth among consumption, production, investment and or savings.  The EIS 
does not account for the finiteness of the factors being substituted – ie. a human being can work for only a finite 
number of hours in each day/month/year; a household has a finite amount of wealth that it can spend (even when 
borrowing and leasing are considered); etc.. 
Even if the EIS is meaningful, the EIS in either consumption-savings domain, or investment domain or 
production domain is never constant because of the following reasons.  Labor markets are incomplete and 
constantly evolving, and in most circumstances, UIWD prevails.  EIS does not account for different perceptions 
of time by different people/groups; and the different values of different types of “time” (ie. leisure time; work 
time; family time) to different people/groups – this is a critical factor in intertemporal analysis.  EIS addresses 
only changes in two periods, which is, or can be very misleading because many decisions and preferences 
substantially multi-period in nature (ie. involve more than three time periods).  EIS is defined completely 
without reference to Investible Wealth or Total Wealth.  This is error, because there are many behavioral biases 
(Anchoring Effects and Framing-Effects) that are intentional (advertising from brokerage firms) or un-
intentional (discussion with spouse/partners) and that observed or un-observed, in the wealth re-allocation 
decision process.  Most of these Framing Effects are based on Total Wealth, or Investible Wealth, or Disposable 
Wealth or Future Wealth.  Furthermore, consumption, Savings, Investment or Production is best defined with 
reference to some form of wealth or Total Wealth.   
The EIS does not consider Regret at both the individual and group levels.  
Giuliano & Turnovsky (2003) notes that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, emphasized by Hall 
(1978, 1988), and Mankiw, Rotemberg & Summers (1985) and others, focuses on intertemporal preferences and 
is well defined in the absence of risk.  This is error because the investor’s wealth re-allocation decision 
processes almost always involves some analysis of risk which is manifested in part by the actual re-allocation 
process.  Giuliano & Turnovsky (2003) notes that a natural definition of the EIS is in terms of the percentage 
change in intertemporal consumption in response to a given percentage change in the intertemporal price.  
Hence, EIS is erroneously defined primarily in terms of consumption and prices, which by themselves are 
insufficient to fully capture the investor’s preferences,  
EIS does not account for the fact that the average investor’s labor income is subject to various shocks; 
and that the investor is able to observe most of the components of his/her labor income in the short run (1-15 
days).   EIS does not account for Anchoring Effects and Framing Effects.  EIS does not account for the fact that 
the average investor’s propensity to substitute is partly based on his/her Total Wealth, wealth available for re-
allocation, and perceived risk of both opportunity costs and returns from abstinence.   
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EIS may be accurate only if the permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) (introduced by Friedman (1957)) is 
correct.  The PIH states that consumption is equal to the annuity value of ‘‘total wealth’’ calculated as the sum 
of the discounted expected value of future income (discounted using the risk-free rate), plus the agent’s “Human 
Wealth” plus financial wealth (cumulative savings).  Contrary to the existing literature and given the analysis 
herein and above (including the Unified Intertemporal Wealth-Allocation Decision Framework; and the 
invalidity of the CSIP Framework), the individual agent’s optimal consumption rule is not governed by the PIH.  
The conditions under which the PIH rule is feasible are un-realistic, and the PIH erroneously implies that 
changes in an individual agent’s consumption are not predictable (Hall, 1978). The PIH is based on the 
erroneous assumptions that: i) utility is quadratic utility; and ii) there is no precautionary savings by the average 
individual, and iii) the individual’s future labor income is riskless, and iv) the subjective discount rate and the 
prevailing interest rate are equal.  Guvenen (2006) and Havranek (2015) also noted that there is conflicting 
evidence about the validity of EIS.  □  
 
 
8. The Relationships Among The Factors. 
 
Theorem-3: For Any Time Interval Or Successive Time Intervals, each of c, t, i, l, b and h is non-monotonic, 
And The relationship between each of c, t, i, l, b and h on one hand and Total Wealth on the other hand, Is 
Also Non-Monotonic, where Total Wealth Is Finite, Worker Effort Is Rewarded With Monetary Benefits And 
Utility/Disutility provided By Consumption/Taxes/Investment/Leisure/Intangibles/Housing Is Non-
Monotonic.   
Proof: For any time interval or any series of successive time intervals, the relationship between total Wealth and 
each of c, t, i, l, b and h is not monotonic because there may be frictions, surprises and other considerations that 
may cause the relationship to change, such as new knowledge; fairness; pressure from spouse/partner; 
willingness to defer gains/losses; need for leisure time; involuntary changes in work conditions; temporary or 
permanent layoffs; advertising; change of job; etc..  Similarly the relationships between Total Wealth and each 
of c, t, i, l, b and h could change.  The relationships between Total Wealth and on the other hand, each of i and l 
could change due to new knowledge; pressure from spouse/partner; need for leisure time; involuntary changes in 
work conditions; temporary or permanent layoffs; advertising; change of job; etc..  Therefore, di/dW, dp/dW, 
dt/dW, dl/dW, dh/dW and dc/dW are all non-monotonic.    □    
 
Theorem-4: For Any Time Interval Or Successive Time Intervals, each of c, t, i, l, b and h is non-additive, 
And The Relationship Between Total Wealth and Each Of c, t, i, l, b and h Is Also Non-Additive, where Total 
Wealth Is Finite, Worker Effort Is Rewarded With Monetary Benefits And Utility/Disutility provided By 
Consumption/Taxes/Investment/Leisure/Intangibles/Housing Is Non-Monotonic.   
Proof: Each of c, t, i, l, b and h is non-additive in any time interval – for example, where c(.) is a consumption 
function, c(x) + c(y)  c(x+y).  First, allocations of wealth to c, t, i, l, b and h are done primarily at the 
beginning of the subject period (and also during the subject period), and any additional allocations require either 
reduction of allocations to the other five factors or a change in Total Wealth, which in turn, causes changes in 
Anchoring, Framing and preferences, all of which changes the utility/disutility of the sum of the added 
allocations {c(x+y)}.  The second reasons is that the average investor derives different amounts of utility from, 
and assigns different risk profiles for each of c, t, i, l, b and h, and such utility are dynamic.  Thus, when c(x) is 
added to c(y) the relative risk of c, t, i, l, b and h is very likely to change such that the sum will not be c(x+y).  It 
also follows automatically that the relationship between Total Wealth and each of c, t, i, l, b and h is also non-
additive.    □   
  
Theorem-5: For Any Time Interval Or Successive Time Intervals, The relationship between Total Wealth, 
and each of c, t, i, l, b and h is recursive, where Total Wealth Is Finite, Worker Effort Is Rewarded With 
Monetary Benefits, And the Utility/Disutility provided By 
Consumption/Taxes/Investment/Leisure/Intangibles/Housing Is Non-Monotonic.   
Proof: - < v, y, x, z, s, r < + are the numbers of units of Total Wealth allocated to Consumption, Taxes, 
Investment, Leisure, Intangibles and Housing respectively, in the periodic wealth allocation process.  Because of 
UIWD, in every sub-period t, the amount of Total Wealth allocated to a factor is a direct function of:  
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a) amounts of wealth allocated to all six factors in the prior period – the utility/disutility gained from such prior 
allocations shape decisions about future allocations and expected Regret.   
b) Amounts of Wealth allocated to the other five factors in the current period (three of c(t+1), t(t+1), i(t+1), l(t+1), b(t+1), 
h(t+1)) – which also affected re-allocations in the current period.       
c) The portion of Total Wealth that is available for allocation in the current period (w(t+1)). 
d) Total Wealth (WT)    
Therefore, c, t, i, l, b and h are recursive, and:    
x(t+1) = f(xt, vt, yt, zt, rt, st, w(t+1), v(t+1), y(t+1), z(t+1), r(t+1), s(t+1), WT)    
v(t+1) = f(xt, vt, yt, zt, rt, st, w(t+1), x(t+1), y(t+1), z(t+1), r(t+1), s(t+1), WT)    
y(t+1) = f(xt, vt, yt, zt, rt, st, w(t+1), v(t+1), x(t+1), z(t+1), r(t+1), s(t+1), WT)    
z(t+1) = f(xt, vt, yt, zt, rt, st, w(t+1), v(t+1), y(t+1), i(t+1), r(t+1), s(t+1), WT)    
r(t+1) = f(xt, vt, yt, zt, rt, st, w(t+1), v(t+1), y(t+1), i(t+1), xt+1), s(t+1), WT)    
s(t+1) = f(xt, vt, yt, zt, rt, st, w(t+1), v(t+1), y(t+1), i(t+1), r(t+1), x(t+1), WT)    
 
Also, the relationship between Total Wealth (W) and each of c, t, i, l, b and h is recursive in any time interval or 
a series of successive time intervals  – thus where a, b, d, e, j, k are variables with defined formulas:    
dx(t+1)/dW(t+1) = a*f{dxt/dWt} because for most investors, investment returns in the first period and the change in 
Total Wealth has a direct effect on the amount of wealth that is allocated to Investments in the second period.       
dv(t+1)/dW(t+1) = b*f{dxt/dWt} because for most investors, the utility/disutility gained from consumption in the 
first period and the change in Total Wealth have a direct effect on the amount of wealth that is allocated to 
Consumption in the second period and subsequent periods.           
dy(t+1)/dW(t+1) = d*{dyt/dWt} because for most investors, the amount of wealth allocated to Taxes and the 
associated returns in the first period and the change in Total Wealth both have a direct effect on the amount of 
wealth that is allocated to Taxes in the second and subsequent periods.              
dz(t+1)/dW(t+1) = e*{dzt/dWt} because for most investors, the amount of wealth allocated to Leisure and the 
associated returns in the first period and the change in Total Wealth both have a direct effect on the amount of 
wealth that is allocated to Leisure in the second period and subsequent time periods.    □                     
 
 
Theorem-6: a) The Marginal Rate Of Intertemporal Joint Substitution measures the propensity for an 
investor/household to substitute units of Consumption, Taxes, Investment, Leisure, Intangibles and Housing 
(factors), where Total Wealth is finite and limited in each time interval, and the effects of such substitution 
may increase or decrease the other five factors; b) the Marginal Rate Of Inter-temporal Joint Substitution 
(MRIJS) measures the investor’s propensity to substitute/re-allocate one unit of Total Wealth from any of 
five factors (c, l, t, i, b or h) to a sixth factor.      
Proof: - < v, y, x, z, s, r < + are the numbers of units of Total Wealth allocated to Consumption, Taxes, 
Investment, Leisure, Intangibles and Housing respectively, in the periodic wealth allocation process.  W(x) is a 
wealth function; and wt denotes the Periodic Total Wealth to be allocated at the beginning of the budget period.  
The Utility gained by the household from such wealth is a function defined as:  
U(c,t,I, l,b,h) = F{W(c,t,I, l,b,h)} 
 
wt = vc + yt +xi +zl+sb+rh             
v = (Wt- xit - sbt - ltzt-ytt-rht)            
x = (Wt- vct - sbt - lzt-ytt-rht)                    
y = (Wt- vct - itx - sbt - ltz-rht)                      
z = (Wt- vct - sbt - itx-yt-rht)                     
s = (Wt- vct-itx-ltz-ytt-rht)            
r = (Wt- vct-sbt -itx-ytt-ltz)            
 
Let:     
C΅= the rate of substitution of Consumption with respect to the other five factors – that is, the average change in 
Consumption, as a result of simultaneous changes in the other five factors.   
I΅ = the rate of substitution of Investment with respect to the other five factors – that is, the average change in 
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Investment, as a result of simultaneous changes in the other five factors.   
T΅ = the rate of substitution of Taxes with respect to the other five factors – that is, the average change in Taxes, 
as a result of simultaneous changes in the other five factors.   
L΅ = the rate of substitution of Leisure with respect to the other five factors – that is, the average change in 
Leisure expenditures, as a result of simultaneous changes in the other five factors.    
B΅ = the rate of substitution of Intangibles with respect to the other five factors – that is, the average change in 
expenditure on Intangibles, as a result of simultaneous changes in the other five factors.   
H΅  = be the rate of substitution of Housing with respect to the other five factors – that is, the average change in 
Housing expenditures as a result of simultaneous changes in the other five factors. 
 
C΅, I΅, T΅, L΅, B΅ and H΅ are measured over one or more periods and thus, there is some averaging.    
Then:  
΅ = v/Wt - v/xt - v/yt - v/zt - v/st - v/st                       
L΅ = z/Wt- z/xt - z/yt - z/vt - z/st - z/rt                    
T΅ = y/Wt - y/x - y/vt - y/zt - y/st - y/rt                        
I΅ = x/Wt - x/vt - x/yt - x/zt - x/st - x/rt                    
B΅ = s/Wt - s/vt - s/yt - s/zt - s/xt - s/rt                    
H΅ = x/Wt - r/vt - r/yt - r/zt - r/st - r/xt                    
 
C΅, L΅, T΅, I΅, B΅, H΅ are referred to as the Marginal Rates Of Substitution.  
 
MRIJS is the Marginal Rate Of Inter-temporal Joint Substitution.  MRIJS is the investor’s propensity to 
substitute/re-allocate one unit of Total Wealth from any of five factors (c, l, t, i, b or h) to a sixth factor.  MRIJS 
ε (0, 1).    
 
MRIJS  =  exp[Min{0, -(C΅ + L΅ + T΅ + I΅+ B΅+ H΅}]   
 
Thus, MRIJS is a measure of both a person’s ability-to-repay and willingness-to-repay an obligation.  The 
greater a person’s total wealth, the greater his/her ability to reallocate such wealth among the six factors.   
The MRIJS implicitly incorporates Regret, because the person’s reallocation of wealth among the six factors 
implicitly includes a regret minimization process.   
 
  □ 
 
9. Other Recent Research On Asset Pricing.  
Given the foregoing analysis, the theories and models introduced and or discussed in the following articles, are 
either moot or inaccurate: Meghir & Weber (1996); Ray & Robson (2012); Chen & Epstein (2002); Ozsoylev & 
Walden (2011); Hugonnier (2012); Adam & Marcet (2011); Epstein & Zin (1989); Duffie & Strulovici (2012);  
Bossaerts, Plott & Zame (2007); Alvarez & Jermann (2005); Alvarez & Jermann (2000).   
 
 
 
10. Conclusion. 
In most markets, investors’ preferences diverge substantially, all existing asset pricing models are 
inaccurate because the underlying assumptions are not realistic.  Obviously, this has important ramifications for 
asset management and capital budgeting.  The Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution is very inaccurate 
especially where markets are incomplete and investors’ preferences are both dynamic and multi-faceted.  The 
focus on consumption and price as the definition of investors’ preferences and constraints is very limited and 
misleading – the investors’ decision problem is much broader in scope.   
 Given the problems and inaccuracies inherent in the Consumption-Savings-Investment-Production 
dichotomy, the more unified asset-pricing approach introduced herein (UIWD) is more likely to result in better 
policy decisions.  The MRIJS is distribution-free, does not require use of any specific utility functions, 
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implicitly accounts for risk (by multi-faceted wealth allocation) and provides a more unified and accurate 
indication/analysis of the average investor’s wealth allocation decisions.  MRIJS and theorems 4 & 5 & 6 and 
the theories introduced herein are also testable hypothesis, which can become the foundation for further detailed 
models that are better able to reflect reality and economic transactions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Bibliography.   
1. Adam K & Marcet A (2011).  Internal Rationality, Imperfect Market Knowledge And Asset Prices. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 146(3): 1224-1252.   
2. Aguiar M & Hurst E (2007). Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time Over Five Decades. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2007) 122 (3): 969-1006. 
3. Albuquerque & Wang N (2008).  Agency Conflicts, Investment and Asset Pricing.  Journal of Finance, 63(1), 
1-40.  
4. Alvarez F & Jermann U J (2005).  Using Asset Prices to Measure the Persistence of the Marginal Utility of 
Wealth.  Econometrica, 73(6): 1977 – 2016.  
5. Alvarez F & Jermann U (2000).  Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default.  
Econometrica, 68(4): 775 – 797.      
6. Attanasio O & Paiella M (2007).  Intertemporal Consumption Choices, Transaction Costs and Limited 
Participation in Financial Markets: Reconciling Data and Theory.  Temi di discussione (Economic working 
papers) 620, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department, Italy.  
7. Avramov D & Chordia T (2006).  Asset Pricing Models and Financial Market Anomalies.  Review Of 
Financial Studies, 19:1001-1040. 
8. Bai J & Ng S (2002).  Determining the Number of Factors in Approximate Factor Models.  Econometrica, 70: 
191-221. 
9. Balvers R & Huang D (2007).  Productivity-Based Asset pricing; Theory And Evidence.  Journal of Financial 
Economics, 86(2): 405-445.   
10. Balvers R & Huang D (2009).  Money And The (C)CAPM: Theory And Evaluation.  Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 44: 337-368.    
11. Banerjee, S. (2007).  Learning From Prices And Dispersion In Beliefs.  Working Paper.  
12. Barberis N & Huang M (2008).  Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security 
Prices.  The American Economic Review, 98(5): 2066-2100.   
13. Barberis N, Huang M & Santos T (2001). Prospect Theory and Asset Prices. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 116 (1): 1-53. 
14. Basak S & Croitoru B (2000).  Equilibrium mispricing in a capital market with portfolio constraints.   
Review Of Financial Studies, 13:715-748.   
15. Basu S & Kimball M (Oct. 2002).  Long Run Labor Supply And The Elasticity Of Intertemporal Substitution 
For Consumption.  Available at: https://files.nyu.edu/cps272/public/ReadingGroup/Shenghao030207.pdf; and 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mkimball/pdf/cee_oct02-3.pdf.  
16. Battig R J & Jarrow R A (1999).  The second fundamental theorem of asset pricing: a new approach.   
Review Of Financial Studies, 12:1219-1235.    
17. Berkelaar A. B. & Kouwenberg R. (2009).  From boom till boost: how loss aversion affects asset prices.  
Journal of Banking & Finance 33(6): 1005-1013. 
18. Boldrin M & Christiano L & Fisher J (2001).  Habit persistence, Asset Returns, And The Business cycle,” 
American Economic Review 91, 149–166.     
25 
 
19. Bonomo M, Garcia R, Meddahi N & Tédongap R (2011). Generalized Disappointment Aversion, Long-run 
Volatility Risk, and Asset Prices.  Review of Financial Studies, (2011) 24 (1): 82-122. 
20. Bossaerts P, Plott C & Zame W R (2007).  Prices and Portfolio Choices in Financial Markets: Theory, 
Econometrics, Experiments. Econometrica, 75(4): 993 – 1038.  
21. Brav A & Heaton J B (2002).  Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies.  Review Of Financial Studies, 
15:575-606.    
22. Bray M (1994).  The Arbitrage Pricing Theory is not Robust - Part 1: Variance Matrices and Portfolio 
Theory in Pictures. Discussion Paper #178, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, January 
1994.  Bray M (1994b).  The Arbitrage Pricing Theory is not Robust  - Part 2: Factor Structures and Factor 
Pricing. Discussion Paper #179, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, January 1994. 
23. Breeden D (1979).  An Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model with Stochastic Consumption and Investment 
Opportunities.  Journal of Financial Economics, 7: 265-96.  
24. Brown G & Cliff M (2004).  Investor Sentiment and Asset Valuation.  Journal of Business, _____________. 
25. Braun M & Larrain B (2005).  Supply Matters For Asset Prices: Evidence From IPOs In emerging Markets.  
Working Paper #06-4, Federal Reserve Bank Of Boston, USA.   
26. Campbell J & Cochrane J (2000).  Explaining the Poor Performance of Consumption Based Asset Pricing 
Models.  Journal of Finance 28, 63-78.  
27. Campbell C J, Kazemi H & Nanisetty P (1999).  Time-varying risk and return in the bond market: a test of a 
new equilibrium pricing model.  Review of Financial Studies, 12:631-642. 
28. Chambers M, Garriga C & Schlagenhauf D E (2009).  The loan structure and housing tenure decisions in an 
equilibrium model of mortgage choice.  Review of Economic Dynamics, 12(3):  444-468.   
29. Chambers M, Garriga C & Schlagenhauf D E (2009).  Housing policy and the progressivity of income 
taxation.  Journal of Monetary Economics, ___________.  
30. Chen Z & Epstein L (2002). Ambiguity, Risk, and Asset Returns in Continuous Time.  Econometrica, 70(4): 
1403–1443.   
31. Chen S & Cheng-Ho H & Jordan B (1997).  Real Estate and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory: Macro-variables  
vs. Derived Factors.  AREUEA Journal of Real Estate Economics, 25:505-523.    
32. Cho S (2010).  Household wealth accumulation and portfolio choices in Korea.  Journal of Housing 
Economics, __________.    
33. Cochrane J (1996).  A Cross-Sectional Test of an Investment-Based Asset Pricing Model.  Journal of 
Political Economy 104, 572-621.  
34. Cox J., Ingersoll J & Ross S (1985).  An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model Of Asset Prices.  
Econometrica, 53:385-408.   
35. Campbell J (1993).  Intertemporal Asset Pricing without Consumption Data. American Economic Review, 
3:487-512.     
36. Corrado C, Charles Hulten C & Sichel D (2006). Intangible Capital and US Economic Growth. Review of 
Income and Wealth Series 55, Number 3, September 2009.  http://www.conference-
board.org/pdf_free/IntangibleCapital_USEconomy.pdf.    
37. Crossley T & Low H (Sept. 2006).  Is The Elasticity Of Intertemporal Substitution Constant ?.   
38. De Giorgi E, Hens T & Mayer J (2007).  Computational aspects of prospect theory with asset pricing 
applications.  Computational Economics, 29(3-4): 267-281.  
39. De Roon F & Szymanowska M (2012).  Asset Pricing Restrictions on Predictability: Frictions Matter.  
Management Science, 58(10): 1916-1932.  
40. Detemple J & Murthy S (1997).  Equilibrium Asset Prices And No-Arbitrage With Portfolio Constraints.  
Review of Financial Studies, 10:1133-1174.      
41. Dodonova A & Khoroshilov Y (______). Applications of Regret Theory to Asset Pricing.   
42. Donihue M & Avramenko A (March 2007).  Decomposing Consumer Wealth Effects: Evidence On The Role 
Of Real Estate Assets Following The Wealth Cycle Of 1990-2002.  Working Paper #06-15, Federal Reserve 
Bank Of Boston, USA.   
43. Duffie D & Strulovici B (2012). Capital Mobility and Asset Pricing. Econometrica, 80(6): 2469 – 2509.  
44. Ehrhardt M C. (Summer 1987).  Arbitrage Pricing Models: The Sufficient Number of Factors and 
Equilibrium Conditions.  Journal of Financial Research, 10:111-120.     
45. El-Attar M & Poschke M (2011). Trust and the Choice Between Housing and Financial Assets: Evidence 
26 
 
from Spanish Households.  Review of Finance (2011) 15 (4): 727-756 
46. Epstein L. & Zin S (1989).  Substitution, Risk Aversion, And The Temporal Behavior Of Consumption And 
Asset Returns I: A Theoretical Framework.  Econometrica, 57: 937-69.     
47. Fama E & French K R (1996).  Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies.  Journal of Finance, 
___________.  
48. Fama E (1998).  Determining The Number of Priced State Variables in the ICAPM.  Journal Of Financial & 
Quantitative Analysis, 33:217-231. 
49. Ferson E, Sarkissian S & Simin T (2003).  Spurious Regressions in Financial Economics ?. Journal of 
Finance, 58:1393-1414.  
50. Flam S (2010).  Portfolio Management Without Probabilities or Statistics.  Annals Of Finance, _______.   
51. Garcia R, Renault E & Semenov A (2006).  Disentangling risk aversion and intertemporal 
substitution through a reference level.  Finance Research Letters, 3(3): 181-193. 
52. Garnier J, Nishimura K & Venditti A (2007).  Intertemporal substitution in consumption, labor supply 
elasticity and sunspot fluctuations in continuous-time models.  International Journal of Economic Theory, 3(4): 
235 – 259.   
53. Gay G & Jung D (1999).  A Further Look At Transaction Costs, Short Sale Restrictions And Futures Market 
Efficiency: The Case of Korea Stock Index.  Journal Of Futures Markets, 19(2):153-172.   
54. Gelber A & Mitchell J (2012). Taxes and Time Allocation: Evidence from Single Women and Men. Review 
of Economic Studies, 79 (3): 863-897. 
55. Gerard B & Wu G (2006).  How Important Is Intertemporal Risk For Asset Allocation ?.  Journal Of 
Business, 79(4):2203-2210.          
56. Giuliano P & Turnovsky S (2003).  Intertemporal Substitution, Risk Aversion, and Economic Performance 
in a Stochastically Growing Open Economy.  Journal of International Money and Finance, 22(4): 529-556.    
57. Gharghori P, Chan H & Faff R (2007).  Are The Fama-French Factors Proxying Default Risk?  Australian 
Journal of Management, 32: 223 - 249.  
58. Gomes J F, Yaron A & Zhang L (2006).  Asset Pricing Implications Of Firms’ Financing Constraints.   
Review of Financial Studies, 19:1321-1356. 
59. Goval A & Welch I (2008).  A comprehensive Look at the Empirical Performance of Equity Premium 
Prediction.  Rev. Financ. Stud. (2008) 21 (4): 1455-1508. 
60. Green R & Hollifield B (1992).  When Will Mean-Variance Portfolios be Well Diversified ?.  Journal of 
Finance, 47: ________. 
61. Gronau, R. (1977).  Leisure, home production and work – the theory of the Allocation of Time Revisited.  
Journal Of Political Economy, __________. 
62. Guo H (May/June 2004).  A Rational Pricing Explanation For The Failure Of The CAPM.  Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, pp. _________.           
63. Guvenen, F. (2006).  Reconciling Conflicting Evidence on the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution: 
A Macroeconomic Perspective.  Journal of Monetary Economics, 53:1451-1472. 
64. Hall, R.E. (1978). Stochastic implications of the Life Cycle-permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory And 
Evidence. Journal of Political Economy 91 (6), 249–265.      
65. Han B & Yang L (2013).  Social Networks, Information Acquisition, and Asset Prices.  Management 
Science, 59(6): 1444-1457.   
1) Havranek, T. (2015). Measuring Intertemporal Substitution: The Importance of Method Choices and 
Selective Reporting.  Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(6), ______.     
66. Hirshleifer D (2001).  Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing.  Journal of Finance, 56(4):1533-1598. 
67. Hodrick R. &  Zhang X (2001).  Evaluating the Specification Errors of Asset Pricing Models."  
Journal of Financial Economics 62, 327-376.  
68. Hugonnier J (2012).  Rational Asset Pricing Bubbles and portfolio constraints.  Journal of Economic 
Theory, 147(6): 2260-2302.   
69. Hung M & Wang J (2005). Asset Prices Under Prospect Theory and Habit Formation. Rev. Pac. Basin 
Finan. Mark. Pol., 08(1): _______.  
70. Iacoviello M & Pavan M (Nov. 2009).  Housing And Debt Over The Life Cycle And Over The Business 
Cycle.  Working Paper #09-12, Federal Reserve Bank Of Boston, USA.   
71. Jaganathan R & Wang Z (2002).  Empirical Evaluation of Asset Pricing Models: A Comparison of the SDF 
27 
 
and Beta Method.  Journal of Finance, 57: 2337-2367.  
72. Jamison J & Wegener J (Nov. 2009).  Multiple Selves In Intertemporal Choice.  Working Paper #09-17, 
Federal Reserve Bank Of Boston, USA.   
73. Jermann U (2005).  The Equity Premium Implied by Production.  Working Paper, University of 
Pennsylvania, March 2005.  
74. Joyce J & Vogel R (1970).  The Uncertainty In Risk: Is Variance Unambiguous ?  Journal Of Finance, 
25(1): 127-134.  
75. Kim, DH and Lee, CI (2007).  On-the-Job Human Capital Accumulation in a Real Business Cycle Model: 
Implications for Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity and Labor Hoarding.  Review of Economic Dynamics, 
10(3): 494-518. 
76. Korniotis G & Kumar A (2011).  Do Behavioral Biases Adversely Affect the Macro-economy? 
Review Of Financial studies, (2011) 24 (5): 1513-1559 
77. Kumar V &  Ziemba W (1993).  The Effect of Errors in Means, Variances, and Covariances on Optimal 
Portfolio Choice.  Journal of Portfolio Management, 19(2): 6-11.     
78. Lee, CI (2008).  On-the-job Human Capital Investment and Inter-temporal Substitution: New evidence on 
intertemporal substitution elasticity.  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(10): 3350-3375. 
79. Lettau M. & Ludvigson S C (2001).  Resurrecting the (C)CAPM: A Cross-Sectional Test When Risk Premia 
are Time-Varying,” Journal of Political Economy, 109:1238-1287.  
80. Lewellen, J. & Nagel S (2006).  The Conditional CAPM Does Not Explain Asset-Pricing Anomalies.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 82: 289-314.    
81. Lewis K K (1991).  Should the holding period matter for the intertemporal consumption-based 
CAPM?  Journal of Monetary Economics, 28(3): 365-389.  
82. Lia Y & Yang L (2013). Prospect theory, the disposition effect, and asset prices.  Journal of Financial 
Economics, 107(3): 715–739. 
83. Llewellen J, Nagel S & Shanken J (2007).  A skeptical appraisal of asset-pricing tests.  Working Paper.    
84. Lybbert T & McPeak J (2012).  Risk and intertemporal substitution: Livestock portfolios and off-take among 
Kenyan pastoralists.  Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 415-426.   
85Australian Journal of Management, 34: 1-20.  http://www.agsm.edu.au/eajm/0906/pdf/Paper1-0906.pdf.    
86.Maslov D & Rytchkov O (_____). Robustness and Monotonicity of Asset Pricing Anomalies.  
http://faculty.mccombs.utexas.edu/~maslov/paper2.pdf 
87. Meghir C & Weber G (1996).  Intertemporal Nonseparability or Borrowing Restrictions? A Disaggregate 
Analysis using a U.S. Consumption Panel.  Econometrica, 64(5): 1151 – 1181. 
88. Merton R C (1973).  An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model.  Econometrica, 41:867-887. 
89. Miao J & Wang N (2007).  Investment, Consumption And Hedging Under Incomplete Markets.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 86: 608-642. 
90. Moskowitz T (2003).  An Analysis of Covariance Risk And Pricing Anomalies.  Review Of Financial 
Studies, 16: 417 - 457. 
91. Neely C, Roy A & Whiteman C (1999).  Risk Aversion Versus Intertemporal Substitution: Identification 
Failure In The Intertemporal Consumption CAPM.  Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, USA.    
92. Nelson D & Wu Y (1998).  Rethinking Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity: The Role of Covariance 
Risk and Noise.  Economic Journal, 108:1686-1706. 
93. Nwogugu M. (2006).  Regret Minimization, Willingness-To-Accept-Losses And Framing.  Applied 
Mathematics & Computation, 179(2):440-450. 
94. Nwogugu M. (2005).  Towards Multifactor Models Of Decision Making And Risk: Critique Of Prospect 
Theory And Related Approaches, Part Three.  Journal Of Risk Finance, 6(3): 267-276.    
95. Nwogugu M (2007).  Correlation, Covariance, Variance And Semi-Variance Are Irrelevant In Risk 
Analysis, portfolio Management And Mechanics.  Working Paper.  Available at www.ssrn.com.   
96. Okubo M (2008). Intertemporal substitution and nonhomothetic preferences.  Economics Letters, 98(1): 41-
47.  
86. Ortalo-Magné F & Rady S (2002).  Tenure choice and the riskiness of non-housing consumption.  Journal of 
Housing Economics, 11(3): 266-279.   
87. Ou-Yang H (2005).  An Equilibrium Model of Asset Pricing And Moral Hazard.  Review Of Financial 
Studies, 18:1253 - 1303. 
28 
 
88. Ozsoylev H N & Walden J (2011).  Asset pricing in large information networks.  Journal of Economic 
Theory, 146(6): 2252-2280.   
89. Parker J & Julliard C (2005).  Consumption Risk and the Cross Section Of Expected Returns.  Journal of 
Political Economy, 113:185-222. 
90. Prono T (June 2009).  Market Proxies, Correlation And Relative Mean-Variance Efficiency: Still Living 
With The Roll Critique.  Working Paper # QAU09-3, Federal Reserve Bank Of Boston, USA.   
91. Prono T (June 2007).  GARCH-based Identification Of Triangular Systems With An Application To The 
CAPM: Still Living With The Roll Critique.  Working Papers #07-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.   
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0701.pdf. 
92. Ray D & Robson A (2012).  Status, Intertemporal Choice, and Risk-Taking.  Econometrica, 80(4): 1505 – 
1531.    
77. Roll, R (1977).  A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory’s Tests.  Journal of Financial Economics, 4: 129-
176. 
1. Salinas, G. (2009). The International Brand Valuation Manual (1
st
 edition). UK: John Wiley & Sons,  
Ltd 
93. Saltari E & Ticchi D (2007).  Risk aversion, intertemporal substitution, and the aggregate investment–
uncertainty relationship.  Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3): 622-648.    
95. Shanken J (1990).  Intertemporal Asset Pricing: An Empirical Investigation.  Journal Of Econometrics, 45: 
99-120. 
1.Slaughter M (2013).  The Contributions of Intangible Property to the U.S. Economy. 
http://www.tiecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/IP-White-Paper-Final-Draft-June-2013.pdf.  
1. Solnik B & Zuo L (2012).  A Global Equilibrium Asset Pricing Model with Home Preference. Management 
Science, 58(2): 273-292.  
96. Stern D (1997).  Limits to substitution and irreversibility in production and consumption: A neoclassical 
interpretation of ecological economics.  Ecological Economics, 21(3): 197-215. 
97. Taleb N (2008).  Finiteness Of Variance Is Irrelevant In The Practice Of Quantitative Finance.  Complexity, 
14(3): 66-76.   
98. Yang F (2009).  Consumption over the life cycle: How different is housing?  Review of Economic Dynamics, 
12(3): 423-443.     
1.Yogo M. (2008). Asset prices under habit formation and reference-dependent preferences. Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics, 26, 131-143. 
99. Wallenius J (2011).  Human capital accumulation and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor: 
How large is the bias?.  Review of Economic Dynamics, 14(4): 577-591.  
100. Wang N (2009).  Optimal Consumption and Asset Allocation with Unknown Income Growth.  Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 56(4), 524-34,  
1. Wang N (2005).  Precautionary saving and partially observed income.  Journal of Monetary Economics, 51: 
1645–1681.    
1. WONG, J. and WONG, N. (2001), The Investment Opportunity Set and Acquired Goodwill. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 18: 173–196.  
1. Wyatt, A., 2005. Accounting Recognition of Intangible Assets: Theory and Evidence on Economic 
Determinants. The Accounting Review, 80, 967-1003.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Bleichrodt H, Cillo A & Diecidue E (2010).  A Quantitative Measurement of Regret Theory.  Management 
Science, 56(1): 161 - 175. 
1. Booth L (2003).  Discounting expected values with parameter uncertainty.  Journal of Corporate Finance, 9: 
505– 519.   
1. Canessa N, Alemanno F, Motterlini F, et. al. (2009).  “Your Regret and My Decisions”: a Neuroimaging 
Study of Social Influence on Emotion-Based Decision Making.  NeuroImage, 47(1): S117.   
29 
 
1. Chandrasekhar P, Capra C M, Moore S, Noussair C & Berns G S (2008).  Neuro-biological regret and rejoice 
functions for aversive outcomes.  NeuroImage, 39(3): 1472-1484.   
1. Coricelli G, Dolan R J & Sirigu A (2007).  Brain, emotion and decision making: the paradigmatic example of 
regret.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(6): 258-265.   
1. Ghosh C (1993).  A Regret-Theoretic Explanation Of Corporate Dividend Policy.  Journal Of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 20(4): 559-573.      
1. Hayashi T (2008).  Regret aversion and opportunity dependence.  Journal of Economic Theory, 139(1): 242-
268.   
1. Laciana, C.E. & Weber E U (2008). Correcting expected utility for comparisons between alternative 
outcomes: A Unified parameterization of regret and disappointment.  Journal of Risk & Uncertainty, 36: 1-17.    
1. Larrick R & Boles T L (1995).  Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation Example.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63(1): 87-97.    
1. Michenaud S & Solnik B (2008).  Applying regret theory to investment choices: Currency hedging decisions.  
Journal of International Money and Finance, 27(4): 677-694.   
1. Muermann A, Mitchell O S & Volkman J M (2006).  Regret, Portfolio Choice, And Guarantees In Defined 
contribution schemes.  Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 39(2): 219-229.   
1. Naim M (2006).  The impact of the net present value on the assessment of the dynamic performance of e-
commerce enabled supply chains.  International Journal Of Production Economics, 104: 382–393.     
1. Nasiry J & Popescu I (2009).  The Price of Consumer Regret.  Working Paper, INSEAD. 
http://web.uvic.ca/econ/research/seminars/Nasiry.pdf.    
1. Nwogugu M. (2006). Regret Minimization, Willingness-To-Accept-Losses And Framing.  Applied 
Mathematics & Computation, 179(2): 440-450. 
1. Sagi A & Friedland N (2007).  The Cost of Richness: The Effect of the Size and Diversity of Decision Sets on 
Post-Decision Regret.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(4): 515-524.   
1. Sanfey A,  Rilling J, Aronson J, Nystrom L &  Cohen J (June 2003).  The Neural Basis of Economic 
Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game.  Science, 300: 1755-6.       
1. Tsalatsanis A, Hozo I, Vickers A & Djulbegovic B (2010).  A Regret Theory Approach to decision curve 
analysis: A novel method for eliciting decision makers' preferences and decision-making.  BMC Medical 
Informatics and Decision Making, 10:51-61.  Available at: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:YfBGWTc2aGoJ:www.biomedcentral.com/1472-
6947/10/51+regret+theory+and+net+present+value&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.   
 
 
1)Nwogugu M. (2005a). Towards Multifactor Models Of Decision Making And Risk: Critique Of Prospect 
Theory And Related Approaches, Part One.  Journal Of Risk Finance, 6(2): 150-162.    
1)Nwogugu M. (2005b).  Towards Multifactor Models Of Decision Making And Risk: Critique Of Prospect 
Theory And Related Approaches, Part Two.  Journal Of Risk Finance, 6(2): 163-173.   
1)Nwogugu M. (2005). Towards Multifactor Models Of Decision Making And Risk: Critique Of Prospect 
Theory And Related Approaches, Part Three.  Journal Of Risk Finance, 6(3): 267-276.    
1) Nwogugu M. (2006). A Further Critique Of Cumulative Prospect Theory And Related Approaches.  Applied 
Mathematics & Computation, 179(2): 451-465. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
